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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the three key failures by the leading external powers in their 
efforts in 1992-1995 to manage the crisis in Bosnia and impose a settlement. Except for 
Russia, these leading powers were the so-called NATO Quad: Britain, France, Germany, 
and the United States. When these powers initially intervened, they failed to comprehend 
the origins and dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. These powers successively failed to 
prevent the outbreak of the fighting, then to properly contain it, and finally to achieve a 
stable and enduring settlement when the chance presented itself in 1995. 
The thesis concludes that the failures stemmed from incorrect assessments, a lack 
of political will, and organizational shortcomings. Because of these failures, the Bosnian 
conflict remains unsettled, and the current stalemate hinges on continuing political-
military commitments by the external powers. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty in 1991 gave birth to a new 
international security environment that can be best described as one of multiple scenarios 
whose chief feature is uncertainty. The wars are now distinctly different from those of the 
immediate past. The world has entered an era, not of peaceful economic competition, but 
of confrontation between ethnic and religious groups. Unfortunately, the leading Western 
powers proved unprepared to deal with the Bosnian challenge in 1992. 
The thesis analyzes the responses of the leading Western powers to the 1992-1995 
war in Bosnia. The initial chapters analyze Bosnian history from the sixth century up to 
the Titoist period in Yugoslavia. At first glance the long chain of fratricidal wars, victims, 
and refugees seems to support the "ethnic hatreds" theory that some Western politicians 
have favored as an explanation for the Bosnian war. Yet the violence in Bosnian history 
has been rather "normal " compared with that in the histories of other European countries 
in the same historical periods. The period from Tito's death in 1980 to the present has 
featured a long chain of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims 
and the active involvement of Serbia and Croatia in the war that took place on Bosnian 
territory until 1995, when the interested external powers- mainly the key NATO powers 
- finally took measures to bring the crisis to an end. 
The thesis also analyzes the Western failures m the Bosnian crisis from an 
organizational perspective. It employs a five-step analytical process. The first step 
identifies the failure itself by using counterfactual analysis. The second identifies the 
unfulfilled critical tasks that led to misfortune. The third conducts a layered analysis that 
focuses on different levels of decision-making and action and examines the behavior and 
the relationships among these echelons that caused failures. Selecting the relevant 
echelons is a sensitive issue since no rules apply in dealing with matters that entail so 
many specificities in each case. Also, such a matrix can easily get over-populated by key 
circumstances and cross-references to relationships among levels and actors at the same 
level of analysis. To deal with these challenges, the thesis presents a simplified chart that 
displays the three general levels Samuel Huntington has proposed to explain the 
relationships among parties in fault line conflicts. Consequently, the analysis focuses on 
Vll 
the behavior and the relationships among key national actors (such as the United States, 
France, Britain, and Germany), international organizations (such as the UN, the EU, the 
OSCE, and NATO), countries that supported the warring parties (such as Croatia and 
Serbia), and the warring parties themselves. Within each of these general levels the 
analysis covers the behavior and the relationships among decision-makers and personnel 
in the field (such as heads of international organizations and their representatives, 
presidents, high officials, military commanders, and intelligence community officials). 
Based on this analysis, the fourth and the fifth steps build and interpret a matrix 
that represents graphically the pathways that led the Western powers to failure. The 
matrix also displays, in a simplified way, the essential tasks these powers might have 
undertaken to avoid failure. Three major failures in succession are thus identified. The 
first was a failure to prevent the Yugoslav crisis from breaking out and then escalating in 
early 1992. The second was a failure to understand the specificity of the Bosnian war's 
origins and dynamics; this led to mismanagement of the crisis between 1992 and 1995. 
The third was a failure to seize the opportunity to bring an enduring peace to Bosnia. 
The analysis of the three failures is the story of a victory of power over justice. 
The resulting status quo is not peace but the artificially imposed absence of war. The 
West has treated effects instead of dealing with causes. The price has been high and has 
cast doubt on the indefinite continuation of the Western military presence that preserves 
the fragile settlement of Dayton. The parties agreed to stop hostilities only under 
considerable U.S. pressure, and informed experts agree that they will resume the war 
when such pressure disappears. 
Thus the overall success of the international intervention depends on the answers 
to two general questions. First, will the West be willing to extend its costly military 
presence in Bosnia indefinitely? Second, will the West be capable of continuing to 
impose peace in Bosnia should other military contingencies arise elsewhere in the world? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of a bi-polar 
international security system but it also shattered naive hopes for a more stable and secure 
global order. The world today is still far from being stable, despite the fact that large-
scale military conflicts between well-defined antagonistic blocs are less likely to occur in 
the foreseeable future. Indeed, new threats and risks have emerged. Complex ethnic, 
religious, and political rivalries and tensions have unleashed painful wars that have 
caused thousands of victims and huge material losses in the past decade. Such violent 
conflicts will probably continue to mark the international environment for a long time. 
In view of the significance for European security of the violent disintegration of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the NATO-led imposition of an interim settlement in Bosnia 
in 1995, this thesis seeks to advance understanding of these events. The thesis includes an 
assessment of successes and failures in the interventions in Bosnia by foreign powers 
during the period 1992-1995. The thesis considers the following five hypotheses: 
• An organization's ability to take efficient actions to provide security depends 
to a great extent upon its ability to accurately assess its power vis a vis the 
power of the other organizations it is in conflict with. 
• Coordination between the political apparatus and the military establishment is 
essential in generating sound military strategies that reflect the appropriate 
political security decisions. During this interaction process failure lurks at 
many levels. It is the analyst's task "to locate and identify those levels, and to 
explore the links that bind together actions and decisions taken at different 
times and in different places that, considered individually, do not seem to 
invite disaster but interreact to generate military misfortune."! 
• Asymmetries in military strategies or decision-making systems may prove in 
some circumstances to be more significant than quantitative military 
asymmetries. 
• Explanations of failure or success should focus on an organization's structure 
and functioning rather than on individuals. 
• Analyses should recognize that an organization might function in a particular 
way at a certain moment in its history that cannot be taken as the 
organization's characteristic way of action. In other words, the evolution of 
1 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The 
Free Press, 1990), p. 24. 
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any organization results from its consecutive functions and structural 
adaptation to external factors. 
The methodology selected for this thesis requires (a) an analytical survey of 
primary as well as secondary sources related to the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and (b) 
analyses of the interacting parties in conflict. 
Two chapters are devoted to an analytical survey of Bosnian history from the sixth 
century to the present. The survey refers to numerous political leaders, military 
commanders, and diplomats to emphasize historical moments in the Bosnian history, but 
it does not focus on causal relationships. This survey seeks to avoid three misleading 
effects that may be generated by "utilitarian history:" 
• A distortion of reality by an exclusive focus on the leader's actions and 
decisions, in the case of "applicatory" history; 
• A reckless ransacking of history for evidence to support a priori positions, in 
the case of history in support of a principle; and 
• Myth-making and morale-building at the expense of truth, in the case of the 
"monumental history. "2 
The analysis of the interacting parties in the conflict will apply a five-step method 
Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch present in their book Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy 
of Failure in War.3 The first step requires the exact identification of what the failure was. 
To do so one must resort to counterfactual analysis, or more simply, make a judgement as 
to what would have been required to transform failure into something less harmful, such 
as a mere setback. The second step requires the exact identification of the critical tasks 
that were incomplete or unfulfilled and thus determined the eventual failure. The third 
step requires the conduct of a "layered analysis" that examines behavior at different levels 
of organization and their relative contributions to the failure. The fourth step demands an 
"analytical matrix," a simplified chart of contributing failures that presents graphically the 
key problems leading to ultimate failure. Finally, the last step identifies the larger causes 
of the ultimate failure in question. 
2 Ibid., p. 37. 
3 Ibid., p. 46. 
2 
Chapter IT of the thesis provides the minimum of Bosnian historical background 
required for an understanding of the developments in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. The 
"Restless Bosnia" chapter briefly reviews several relevant historic events related to the 
false national allegiances based on religion of the three Bosnian communities (such as the 
Orthodox Christian-Roman Catholic rivalry over the centuries), ethnic origins (such as 
the formation of the Serb and Croat ethnic groups), and part of the Titoist period in 
Bosnia. 
Chapter Ill analyzes five stages in the actions of the most significant nations and 
international organizations involved in the 1992-1995 war and post-war arrangements in 
Bosnia. The five main stages of the war are as follows: (a) Bosnia from Tito's death in 
1980 to the 1991 elections; (b) the process of pursuing Bosnia's de jure independence 
(October 1991-April 1992); (c) Western failure (early 1992-early 1994); (d) conflict 
resolution efforts in Bosnia (early 1994-late 1995); and (e) post-Dayton developments in 
Bosnia (since December 1995). The survey of these periods focuses on the diplomatic 
and military actions the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian 
Muslims, the Croats, the French, the British, the Germans, the Russians, and the 
Americans performed as national actors or as part of international organizations such as 
the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). 
Finally, chapter IV conducts an analysis that seeks to encompass the dynamics of 
the war in Bosnia and to assess the behavior and interactions of all the previously 
mentioned actors. The analysis includes a comparison of the parties' political goals, 
military strategies, concepts of operations, decision-making systems, and military 
organizations. 
The thesis as a whole seeks to demonstrate that the quest for security represents a 
continuous process and not simply the absence of war. Although war sometimes puts the 
very existence of nations into question, it must be recognized as an inevitable factor in the 
pursuit of security, pending the construction of an international order that might someday 
eliminate war. As nations are continuously engaged in defending their security, an 
accurate assessment of lessons from recent conflicts and potential developments becomes 
3 
crucially important, in peacetime as well as in war. The great challenge is to avoid 
failures to learn from the past or current developments, to anticipate the nature of a 
potential war, and/or to create a military establishment capable of rapid adaptation to new 
requirements. Incorrect assessments could result in catastrophic decisions that might lead 
nations into collapse and subjugation. 
4 
II. RESTLESS BOSNIA 
Conflicts of interests among various groups have constantly and sometimes 
violently shaped the relations among nations and ethnic or religious communities in the 
Balkans. Many observers argue that these conflicts stem from ancient hatreds. According 
to Huntington, fault line conflicts1 between groups from different civilizations within a 
state can be buried for years or decades; but they always return. They tend to be vicious, 
bloody, and lengthy, since fundamental issues regarding the identity of the parties 
involved are at stake. In Huntington's view, "they may be interrupted by truces or 
agreements but these tend to break down and the conflict is resumed. "2 Therefore an 
enduring peace seems to be a rather hopeless prospect in the Balkans. 
History has an importance that must be carefully and realistically assessed. It is 
dangerous to underestimate the weight of history but it may be equally unwise to 
overestimate it. Inherited hatreds in the region have repeatedly resulted in cycles of killing 
and revenge that have paved the way to future explosions of extreme hate and subsequent 
violence. The establishment of an enduring peace in the Balkans requires a good 
understanding of not only the history of this region but also of some other complex 
factors, sometimes even more dangerous than the region's history, that may generate 
extreme violence. Are the developments in Bosnia the exclusive result of the objective 
differences among the three principal communities? Certainly not. These differences do 
not suffice to explain the latest rampant escalation of hate and violence in Bosnia. Yet 
history may help analysts comprehend the patterns of political and strategic culture of the 
Bosnian communities and deepen the understanding required when analyzing complex 
and dynamic phenomena. 
Geography has placed Bosnia in one of the world's most restless places. Nations 
and ethnic and religious minorities have crossed paths for centuries here. Shifting 
alliances and a series of dominant powers have shaped the dynamic environment of the 
region. Above all, the absence of any ethnically homogeneous province here, let alone 
any racially homogeneous ·state, can only complicate the already complex phenomena and 
I Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Touchstone, 1997), p. 208. 
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raise questions about the theories of pure ethnic identities that have dominated the 
national politics of the Balkan lands. Indeed, the study of the early history of Bosnia, a 
country often called the microcosm of the Balkans, demonstrates that there is no factual 
basis for conducting modem policies in terms of ancient ethnic origins. 
A. FIRST SETTLERS 
It is impossible to find a definite date for the beginning ofBosnian history. Yet for 
reasons of language, culture and more than a thousand years of history, it is probably fair 
to say that the arrival of Slavs in the Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries is the 
natural starting-point for any history of Bosnia. 
The Illyrians were the earliest inhabitants of much of modem Yugoslavia and 
Albania. Initially they spoke an Indo-European language related to modem Albanian. 
This was supplemented by Latin, under the firm Roman rule. On the territory 
corresponding to the modem Yugoslavia, the South Slavs either drove out or eventually 
absorbed the existing Illyrian population.3 In addition to Romans and Slavs, Goths, 
Asiatic Huns, Iranian Alans, and A vars transited the region, but it was the Slavs who 
assimilated them all. 
"By the 620s a Slav population was well established in the modem Bulgaria and 
Serbia, and had probably penetrated into Bosnia too. Then within a few years, two new 
Slav tribes arrived on scene: the Croats and the Serbs. "4 By the seventh century both 
tribes had established kingdoms in Central Europe: "White Croatia," which included part 
of modem southern Poland, and "White Serbia," which covered the modem Czech lands. 
It was from there that they came south, to the western Balkans. 5 
The Serbs settled in the area corresponding to modem southwestern Serbia and 
later gradually extended their rule into modem Montenegro and Herzegovina. "The 
Croats settled in areas roughly corresponding to modem Croatia, probably including most 
2 Ibid., p. 252. 
3 Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Carroll & GrafPublishers Inc., 
1996), p. 3. 
4 Noel Malcohn, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 6. 
5 Ibid., p. 7. 
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of modem Bosnia proper."6 The Serbs and the Croats had been, from the earliest times, 
distinct but closely connected, living and migrating in tandem. By the time they came to 
the Balkans there was already a large Slav population in place that absorbed both the Serb 
and Croat populations. According to reputable historians, the major Slav substratum, 
which must have already absorbed the remnants of the original Illyrians, Celts, Romans, 
Goths, Alans, Huns, Avars, and individuals from all parts ofthe Roman Empire, cannot 
be divided into sub-ethnic groups. To the same end, "in spite of later division, both 
political and religious, the language spoken by most of the South Slav people has stayed 
the same to the present day."7 Therefore, any attempt to invent ancient ethnic divisions 
among their descendants is necessarily futile and cannot be based on any reliable 
historical evidence. 
The political history of the western Balkans from the seventh to the eleventh 
centuries is "patchy and confused, with a succession of conquests and shifting 
allegiances,"8 dominated by the neighboring Byzantine Empire and Hungary. Yet Bosnia 
proper seemed to be more linked to the Croat lands than to Byzantium and aligned 
towards the Croat-Hungarian cultural and political realm. The same held true of religious 
organization, in that the bishopric of Bosnia is mentioned as a Roman Catholic see in the 
eleventh century (after the Great Schism between Rome and Constantinople in 1054).9 
B. TRADITIONAL REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE IDENTITY OF 
BOSNIA 
The history of Bosnia from 1180 to 1992 is exceptionally complex. Bosnia has 
frequently been subject to external ambitions, resulting in annexation or partition. 
Ottomans, Hungarians, Austro-Hungarians, Serbs, and Croats have relentlessly tried to 
dominate this land or at least grab parts of it. Despite all these attempts, Bosnia has 
enjoyed unity, if not independence or autonomy, for most of its existence. 
6 Ibid., p. 8. 
7 Richard West, op. cit., p. 4 
8 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 9. 
9 Ibid., p. 11. 
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Three powerful rulers stand out between 1180 and the Ottoman conquest in 1463: 
Ban Kulic (1180-1204), Ban Stephen Kotromanic (1322-1353), and King Stephen Tvrtko 
(1353-1391). Two of them expanded Bosnia and made it a powerful state. Under Ban 
Kotromanic Bosnia expanded to include the principality of Hum (Herzegovina). Under 
King Tvrtko Bosnia expanded further to the south and acquired a large part of the 
Dalmatian coast. During the second half of Tvrtko' s reign it managed to become the most 
powerful state within the western Balkans.10 Moreover, King Tvrtko was even-handed in 
dealing with all religious groups under his rule; and "Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the 
fourteenth century, was an example to Europe of how people of different religions could 
live together in harmony."11 These three reigns were the highest points of power and 
independence Bosnia enjoyed in the medieval period. 
Throughout this period Hungary was the dominant neighboring country. The 
Hungarians planned to gain control over the bishopric of Bosnia and got involved in a 
succession dispute by supporting King Ostoja's ascension to the Bosnian throne in 1404. 
Yet in 1414, by supporting Tvrtko II as rightful King of Bosnia, the Ottoman Empire 
disrupted the balance of power, both militarily and politically. The Ottoman Turks made 
clear that from now on they would have an interest and influence in Bosnia rivaling that 
of Hungary. Indeed, a large Turkish army under Mehmet II would conquer Bosnia in 
1463. 
Bosnia enjoyed integrity from the very beginning of Ottoman rule. Until 1580 it 
was a distinct military district incorporated into the eyal~t (or province, the largest 
constituent unit of the Empire) of Rumelia. But in that year the decision was made to 
create a new eyalet: the eyalet of Bosnia. "There was now a Bosnian entity which 
included the whole of modem Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus some neighboring parts of 
Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Serbia. While the old kingdom of Serbia, for example, 
was to remain divided into a number of smaller units, each of which was just one of the 
10 Ibid., p. 13. 
11 Richard West, op. cit., p. 9. 
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many components of the eyalet of Buda or Rumelia, Bosnia was to enjoy this special 
status as a distinct entity for the rest of the Ottoman period."12 
For the next almost four and a half centuries Bosnia was part of the Ottoman 
Empire despite the continuous attempts to gain control over the region by Hungary (later 
Austria-Hungary) and Russia. King Matthias of Hungary made the first of a long chain of 
such attempts. He established a new Hungarian-ruled "banate" of Bosnia and in 1471 
promoted the Ban to the title of "King of Bosnia."I3 The Ottoman Turks regained total 
control in 1528, one year after they had smashed the Hungarian army at Mohacs. In 1689 
the Habsburg army marched again across Bosnia and into Serbia, but the Turks drove it 
back the next year. 
In 1697, after having inflicted a huge defeat on the Turks at the battle of Zenta, 
Prince Eugene led a small army of 6,000 men into the heart of Bosnia. The Treaty of 
Karlowitz in 1699 nonetheless restored Turkish authority over Bosnia; but, by ceding 
Hungary and Transylvania to the Habsburgs, it confirmed the Ottomans' gradual retreat in 
Europe. Consequently, after the huge defeat inflicted by the same Prince Eugene on the 
Turks at Petrovaradin in 1716, in the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 Austria received a 
first strip of Bosnian territory. Encouraged by this acquisition, the Austrians violated the 
Treaty of Passarowitz in 1736 and invaded Bosnia. The next year, the Bosnian governor 
Hekim-oglu Ali-pasa defeated the Austrian army at Banja Luka. The defeat resulted in the 
1739 Treaty of Belgrade, whereby the Austrians renounced all the territory they had 
gained at Passarowitz in 1718. 
The next major war- in 1788 - was the result of a plan by Joseph II of Austria 
and Catherine the Great of Russia to take over the Ottoman lands in the Balkans. Austrian 
forces entered Bosnia but withdrew in 1791, when Austria agreed to give up all the gains 
it had made in Serbia and Bosnia as a result of the diplomatic and political pressure of the 
other European powers. 
Austria-Hungary eventually succeeded in taking over Bosnia. Amazingly, it did so 
without any effort. It came as a gift the Congress of Berlin presented to Austria-Hungary 
12 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 50. 
13 Ibid., p. 43. 
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in July 1878. Bosnia and Herzegovina, while still in theory under Ottoman suzerainty, 
was completely occupied by Austria-Hungary on 20 October 1878. 
The Austro-Hungarians had long been aware of the problems posed by gaining 
authority over many Slavs in the Empire. In taking over Bosnia they faced an even greater 
challenge: to keep the Slavs divided in the Balkans. Therefore they had to avoid having 
Croatia expand into a South Slav state as well as to prevent Serbia from initially 
absorbing Bosnia and then undermining Austro-Hungarian rule in Croatia. Consequently, 
"the problem of whether to assign Bosnia to Austria or Hungary was solved by making it 
a Crown land, which meant it was ruled by neither and at the same time by both."'4 
Benjamin Kallay, the highest Austro-Hungarian representative in charge of Bosnia 
between 1882 and 1903, went even farther. He aimed his entire policy at "insulating 
Bosnia from the nationalist political movements in Serbia and Croatia, and developing 
the idea of Bosnian nationhood as a separate and unifying factor."15 Unfortunately, by 
1908 his failure was obvious. Reflecting the increasing cooperation between Serbs and 
Croats in the project of establishing a common South Slav state, Serb students in Bosnia 
abandoned their narrow Serb nationalism for a broader pro-Yugoslav campaign. 
Eventually, partly as a result of the misery of the First World War that had softened the 
divisions between them and other religious comn1unities, the Muslims of Bosnia were 
also willing to take the plunge into a separate Yugoslav state.I6 
The first configuration of the new independent kingdom emerged in November 
1920 with Yugoslav-wide elections for a constituent assembly. The future structure of the 
Yugoslav state preserved the regional-administrative identity of Bosnia. The constitution 
adopted on 28 June 1921 organized the "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes" territory into thirty-three "oblasts" that made Croatia's outline disappear from 
the map while preserving the outline of Bosnia. "Indeed, the six Bosnian oblasts 
corresponded precisely to the six 'Kreise' of the Austria-Hungarians, which had been 
based on the sandzaks (military districts within an eyalet) of the final period of the 
'
4 1bid., p. 137. 
15Jbid.; p. 147. 
16Jbid., p. 161. 
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Ottoman rule."17 Bosnia had managed to be the only constituent element of 
Yugoslavia that would retain its identity. 
Political developments within Yugoslavia soon interrupted this long tradition of 
being a distinct entity. In January 1929 King Alexander suspended the constitution of 
1921 and made an initially symbolic change: the state would now be called "Yugoslavia." 
Furthermore, attempting to erase the old regional identities from the map, King 
Alexander imposed a completely new division of the Yugoslav territory into nine 
"banovine." According to the new division Bosnia was now divided among four of them: 
"Vrbaska, which included some Croatian territory, Drinska, which included a large part 
of Serbia, Zetska, which consisted mainly ofMontenegro, and Primorska, which extended 
to the Dalmatian coast."18 For the first time since 1180 Bosnia had been partitioned. 
The Second World War preserved the partition of Bosnia. Formally incorporated 
into the new "Independent State of Croatia," Bosnia was de facto separated by the 
German-Italian military occupation dividing-line running from northwest to southeast. 
Initially, the prospects for Bosnian unity in a future Communist Yugoslav state were no 
better. The plan based on a Soviet model consisted of five "national republics" for the 
five "nations" of Yugoslavia (Serb, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian and Montenegrin) and 
an autonomous province of Bosnia. It was only through the lively opposition of the 
Bosnian delegates at the "Anti-Fascist Council" in 1943 that Bosnia prevented the plan 
from being adopted. At the Council, Bosnia not only successfully avoided being absorbed 
into Serbia but also achieved the final compromise that gave it republican status yet 
described it as a republic inhabited "by parts of the Serb and Croat nations, as well as by 
the Bosnian Muslims."19 
Consequently, after the Second World War, Bosnia recovered its integrity as one 
of the Titoist Yugoslav republics. Yet Bosnia would be "regarded as somehow lower in 
status than the other republics of Yugoslavia."20 This inferior treatment had come about; 
17 Ibid., p. 165. 
18 Ibid., p. 169. 
19 Ibid., p. 181. 
20 Ibid., p. 201. 
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the Yugoslavs felt, "because Bosnia was seen as containing not a distinctive nation but 
merely fragments of two nations (Serbs and Croats) and a non-nation."21 
C. A BOSNIAN NATION? 
The question of what it meant to be a Muslim in Bosnia - of whether it was a 
religious, an ethnic or a national identity - did not solve itself gradually, despite the 
belief of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the early 1940s that Muslims would 
eventually come to identify with Croats or Serbs. Indeed, the first Party Congress after the 
end of the Second World War had to admit that "Bosnia cannot be divided between 
Serbia and Croatia, not only because Serbs and Croats live mixed together on the whole 
territory, but also because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet decided 
on their national identity."22 
Consequently, the 1948 census offered Bosnian citizens three options: Muslim 
Serb, Muslim Croat or "Muslim, nationally undeclared" (or "undetermined"). 23 The 
results were far from meeting the Yugoslav Communists' expectations: 72,000 declared 
themselves Serbs and 25,000 Croats, but 778,000 registered as "undeclared." The 
Communists were nonetheless strongly promoting a spirit of "Yugoslavism," and 
therefore they organized a new census in 1953 that replaced the category "Muslim" with 
"Yugoslav, nationally undeclared." Once again, the results did not meet their expectations 
since 891,800 Muslims registered now as "Yugoslavs, nationally undeclared."24 
The conjunction of"the decision to drop the policy of 'integral Yugoslavism' and 
strengthen republican identities instead in the early 1960s, and the belated rise of a small 
elite of Muslim Communist officials within the Party machine in Bosnia"25 produced a 
shift towards recognizing the Bosnian Muslims as a nation. The first sign of change came 
in the 1961 census that allowed people to declare themselves "Muslim in the ethnic 
sense." Mirroring this wind of change, the Bosnian constitution referred equally in its 
2! Ibid., p. 201. 
22 Ibid., p. 197. 
23 Ibid., p. 198. 
24 Ibid., p. 198. 
25 Ibid., p. 198. 
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preamble to "Serbs, Croats and Muslims allied in the past by a common life," thus 
implying without specifically stating that Serbs, Croats and Muslims were equally to be 
regarded as nations.26 
Later, the League of Communists in 1965 listed people as either "Serb," "Croat" 
or "Muslim," but success ultimately came at the meeting of the Bosnian Central 
Committee in May 1968. The communique issued then stated: "Practice has shown the 
harm of different forms of pressure . . . from the earlier period when Muslims were 
designated as Serbs or Croats from the national viewpoint. It has been shown, and present 
socialist practice confirms, that the Muslims are a distinct nation. "27 Consequently, the 
1971 census allowed people to register as "Muslim, in the sense of a nation." 
This was the only natural development. Indeed, the ethnic substratum Bosnian 
Muslims identify with is "Slav" or "Bosnian" or "Serbo-Croat;" but to call it either Serb 
or Croat would be inappropriate for two reasons. 
First, no distinct "Serb" or "Croat" entities existed in Bosnia before the 
Islamicization that began after the Ottoman conquest in 1463. As already noted, the Serb 
and Croat tribes that settled on the territory corresponding to Bosnia had been assimilated 
by the larger Slav population in the region. So it would be a falsification of history to talk 
about "Muslim Serbs" or "Muslim Croats," because this would imply that their ancestors 
had been either Serbs or Croats before they became Muslims. 
Second, when Bosnian Christians began, at a very late stage, to identify 
themselves as Serbs or Croats, they did so purely on religious grounds. Indeed, "few 
individuals can have been certain of their precise ethnic genealogy. For centuries the 
language, history and geographical location of these two sorts of Bosnian Christians had 
been the same - which means that in most important respects the substratum which lay 
beneath their own religious identities was one and the same."28 An artificial movement 
based on religious allegiance commenced in the late nineteenth century, when both 
Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians began to claim, with no factual basis, the ethnic labels 
of Serbs and Croats. 
26 Ibid., p. 198. 
27 Ibid., p. 199. 
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Truly, historical enmities had separated Croats and Serbs as collectivities at 
various times in their histories but, strictly speaking, the real differences emerging in the 
late nineteenth century were cultural rather than ethnic. "When all was said and done, the 
only truly irreducible definition of what identified individual Croats, Serbs, and Muslims 
ethnically, and equally important, distinguished them from each other, was religion ... "29 
Indeed, "what made someone a Croat was the fact that he or she was a Roman Catholic, 
just as what made someone a Serb was membership, however attenuated, in the Orthodox 
church. "30 
According to Noel Malcolm, "Only in the mid-nineteenth century at the earliest 
did the modem idea of nationhood begin to spread from Croatia and Serbia to the 
Catholics and Orthodox ofBosnia."31 Teofil Petranovic, a teacher at the Orthodox School 
in Sarajevo, gave one of the first signs. In the 1860s, he formed a group of people to go 
out into the villages and tell the Orthodox peasants that they had to stop calling 
themselves "hriscani" (the local term for "Orthodox") and start calling themselves 
"Serbs."32 A later example is offered by Mehmet-beg, a prominent mayor of Sarajevo. In 
1891 he founded a journal entitled The Bosnian "which attacked conservative attitudes of 
the Muslim clergy and tried to fend off the attempts ofboth Croat and Serb nationalists to 
·argue that Muslims of Bosnia were 'really' Croats or Serbs."33 But the formation of the 
false Serb and Croat national identities continued. Political tensions between Zagreb and 
Belgrade in the 1920s also encouraged prominent Muslims to publicly identify 
themselves as "Muslim Croats" or "Muslim Serbs."34 
Essentially, to call someone in Bosnia a Serb, a Croat, or a Muslim today means 
to use a concept that was constructed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries out of a combination of religion, language, history and the person's own sense 
of identification. Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia are all Bosnians; but, unlike the 
28 Ibid., p. 200. 
29 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 68. 
30 Ibid., p. 69. 
31 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 149. 
32 Ibid., p. 126. 
33 Ibid., p. 148. 
34 1bid., p. 165. 
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"defective" Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, the Muslims have no sponsor-nation. 
Their faith has crucially been related to the existence of a Bosnian entity. 
Under such circumstances, each of the three communities has naturally pursued 
what it perceived as its own "national interests." 
D. SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND FRATRICIDE FIGHTS 
Bosnian history shows many examples of all possible combinations among 
Bosnians (Muslim-Orthodox, Muslim-Catholic, Orthodox-Catholic) to temporarily form 
alliances, provide mutual support against a third party commonly perceived as hostile or 
even to wage fratricidal wars within the same community. 
The long chain of violent fratricidal confrontations began with the Vlachs. Their 
origins can hardly be determined, but a combination of historical linguistics, the study of 
place-names and the history of the Roman Empire suggest that the heartland of the Vlachs 
was in an area stretching from northern Albania through Kosovo and north-central Serbia. 
They were a very mobile people with strong military traditions. Taking into account such 
qualities, both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs saw in the Vlachs the perfect tool 
to defend their borders with minimal costs. Consequently, 'by the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries both empires favored the Vlachs' settlement in the vicinity of their 
common military border. "Apart from the big set-piece campaigns, the military struggle 
between Ottoman and Habsburg on this border consisted mainly, year in, year out, of 
Vlachs fighting Vlachs. "35 
Conversely, the continuous confrontation between the Ottomans and the 
Habsburgs often brought to fore the interests of the Muslims and the Orthodox. In 1690, 
many of the Orthodox welcomed the return of the Turks, after they had experienced for 
one year the zeal of Austrian Catholic priests. In 1788, the same Muslim-Orthodox 
"team" manifested stiff resistance against the Austrians in the frontier region at the 
fortress of Dubica.36 In 1878, local Muslim opposition to the Austrian occupation of 
Bosnia led by Hadzi Lojo enjoyed the support of the leading Orthodox priests, "who were 
35 Ibid., p. 73. 
36 Ibid., p. 87. 
15 
happy to think that Bosnia had thrown off Ottoman rule and had no wish to see it replaced 
by the rule of Austria."37 
There were also confrontations between Christians and Muslims that had 
hardened during the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1853, there were incidents 
caused by the Muslim refusal to permit the construction of an Orthodox church inside 
Travnik and a Catholic church inside Sarajevo. Yet "it was the period 1871-2, according 
to [Josef] Koetschet, that 'we first began to see a picture of religious hatred,'"38 when the 
Bosnian Christians' interests were being promoted by "protector" powers - Russia for 
the Orthodox and Austria-Hungary for the Catholics. One notorious cause was the 
dispute between the Orthodox community and the Muslim clergy, with the latter insisting 
that the new Orthodox "cathedral's belfry should not exceed the height of the Begova 
mosque's minaret. "39 
The Christian-Muslim dispute was seriously aggravated during the last three years 
of Turkish rule in Bosnia as a result of the persecutions Orthodox Serbs were subjected 
to. Consequently, at the end of the Russian-Ottoman war in 1877 "Bosnian Muslims and 
Christians so detested one another that Bosnia left to its own devices would have been a 
hotbed for a long time to come."40 Yet the beginning of the First World War found once 
again Serbs fighting Serbs. 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo. The 
choleric archduke had been the most influential advocate of a Triune Monarchy that 
envisioned an equal status for Austrians, Magyars, and Slavs.4I His death split the 
Bosnian Serb community. There were the loyalists- that is, the Habsburg supporters-
on the one hand and the sympathizers with the Serbian cause on the other. Some leading 
Bosnian Serbs petitioned the Austro-Hungarian authorities to let them go straight to the 
front line against Serbia. Many of the Austro-Hungarian troops from Bosnia sent into 
Serbia under the command of the Bosnian governor, General Potiorek, were Serbs. On 
the opposite side, many Bosnian Serbs volunteered to join the Serbian army; around 
37 Jbid., p. 134. 
38 Ibid., p. 130. 
39 Ibid., p. 131. 
40 Ibid., p. 133. 
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5,000 Bosnian Serbs were known to have joined the "First Serbian Volunteer Division." 
The Orthodox were fighting the Orthodox again. It was in a sense a return to the old days 
ofHabsburg-Ottoman border warfare in the late fifteenth century. 
The beginning of the twentieth century brought a new shift in alliances. Until the 
end of the first decade of the twentieth century the Muslims had usually tended to side 
with the Serbs as natural allies against Austria, but now they tended to side with the 
Croats as natural allies against the excessive centralism promoted by the Serbs. This shift 
was first demonstrated in 1911 in the agreement uniting the 29 Muslim and 23 Catholic 
MPs against the 3 7 Orthodox MPs in the Bosnian Parliament in order to reduce support 
for agrarian reforms:42 In the 1920s the Muslims and the Slovenes operated as a "third 
force to mediate between the anti-centralist Croats and the centralist Serbs."43 
The Second World War once again brought pain and fratricidal fights among and 
within communities as several wars took place simultaneously on Yugoslav territory. 
First, there was the war of the Axis against the Allies that squeezed Yugoslavia for raw 
materials and labor. Second, there was the war of the Axis against Yugoslav resistance 
movements. There were, moreover, two civil wars. "One was a war conducted by 
Croatian extremists against the Serb population of Croatia and Bosnia, a war of 
aggression on one side and sometimes indiscriminate retaliation on the other. And finally 
there was a war between the two main resistance organizations in which the Serbs from 
those areas enlisted: the Cetniks and the Communist Partisans."44 
The Croat Ustasa was the organization of the Croat leader Ante Pavelic, the 
"Poglavic" (Fuhrer) of the Independent State of Croatia, which incorporated Bosnia. 
Cetniks represented the Serb villagers' response to the extremely vicious aggression of 
the Croat Ustasa that even the Germans had found too brutai.45 They were organized by 
Draza Mihailovic, a former Yugoslav Army colonel representing the King, an Anglophile 
and an expert on guerrilla affairs. The Communist Partisans were formed not only by 
Serbs but also by Croats and Muslims. Their leader was Tito, at that time a Stalin loyalist, 
41 Richard West, op. cit., p. 37. 
42 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 152. 
43 Ibid., p. 168. 
441bid., p. 174. 
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who ''was planning a resistance operation which will not only try to drive out the 
Germans, but also engage in a social revolution, seizing power for a post-war Communist 
state."46 
The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs held positions that can easily be 
understood. A minority of Bosnian Croats became "active Ustasa supporters, while the 
majority welcomed the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia to begin with 
and became more and more disenchanted thereafter, until in 1943 and 1944 large 
numbers of them were joining the Partisans."47 The Bosnian Serbs became from the 
beginning active supporters of Cetniks or Partisans that fought against each other as well 
as against Ustasa and the Axis military occupation. 
The Bosnian Muslims were probably the most divided group during the Second 
World War. Because of their inter-war preference for Zagreb, the initial tendency was to 
become active supporters of Ustasa. But disillusionment set in quickly among the 
Muslims: the rule of law simply did not operate in the Ustasa Independent State of 
Croatia. Consequently, the Bosnian Muslims issued "the Mostar resolution that referred 
to 'innumerable crimes, abuses, illegalities and forced conversions"'48 committed against 
the Orthodox Serbs by the Catholic Croats in the Usatsa. Although this resolution might 
suggest a new shift in the Muslims' sympathy from the Croats to the Serbs, this was not 
the case, since with few exceptions, relations between Muslims and Cetniks (composed 
ofOrtodox Serbs) generally proved tense. Additionally, Muslims were not represented in 
the royal government-in-exile. In fact, being so divided among them and disappointed by 
previous alliances, the Bosnian Muslims tried to form their own local defense units to 
protect themselves against everyone else. By October 1942 there was a "Muslim 
Volunteer Legion" that fought more against the Conimunist Partisans than against the 
Cetniks and that distrusted the Ustasa. In April 1943 the Bosnian Muslims also formed 
the SS Handzar Division, which to their disappointment was sent to Germany instead of 
being used to protect Muslim towns and villages. Partly as a result of their 
45 Ibid., p. 176. 
46 Ibid., p. 177. 
47 1bid., p. 184. 
48 Ibid., p. 186. 
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disappointment many Muslims, including 2,000 members of the SS Handzar division, 
joined the Partisans and formed Tito' s "Sixteenth Muslim Brigade" in September 194 3. 
The end of the war found the Muslims "reconciled to the prospect of Communist 
rule: instead of absorption in Croatia (the Ustasa solution) or absorption in Serbia (the 
Cetnik plan), they were offered a vaguely federal solution in which Bosnia would 
continue to exist."49 They had fought on all sides and had suffered losses from all sides. 
Unfortunately, the Bosnian victims of the Second World War were not to be the 
last ones. They were added to a long list of refugees, people driven from their homes, and 
victims of atrocities and extreme violence in Bosnian history. 
E. VIOLENCE IN BOSNIAN HISTORY 
The numerous wars and long rivalries among Ottomans, Austrians (or Austro-
Hungarians), Croats, and Serbs -and among Yugoslavs themselves- and the tragic 
consequences of the two world wars have generated a large number of refugees and 
victims that has had a great impact on the size and nature of the Bosnian population. 
There have been many such examples in Bosnian history. Perhaps these examples have 
been too numerous to leave much hope for any healing in the foreseeable future. 
One such episode occurred during the Austrian-Ottoman war of 1683-1699. The 
first refugees fled to Bosnia in 1684-1687. They were 130,000 Muslim converts and 
Ottoman spahis retreating southwards from their abandoned households as the Austrians 
gradually conquered Ottoman-ruled Hungary. Some of the!ll, who had lost everything, 
"were embittered men who probably brought with them a new sense of hostility to 
Christianity."50 But soon Christians were to flee also. 
In 1690 Turks drove back the Austrians after their march across Bosnia in the 
previous year. Led by their Patriarch, at least 30,000 Orthodox Serbs fled northwards with 
the retreating Austrian army. Catholics soon shared the same fate. 
49 Ibid., p. 192. 
50 Ibid., p. 85. 
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Catholics joined a retreating Austrian army seven years later. Thousands of 
Catholic merchants accompanied Prince Eugene on his return northwards after he 
successfully raided Sarajevo on 22 October 1697. 
According to Noel Malcolm, if not already by the second half of the seventeenth 
century, the Orthodox population of Bosnia definitely outnumbered the Catholics by the 
end of the 1683-1699 war.SI As for the Muslims and Christians in Bosnia, they had no 
major conflicts in the next century. It was Serb anti-Ottoman feeling that triggered the 
violence again at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
In 1804 a serious revolt broke out in Serbia, and there was an uprising of people 
belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia. "The general anti-Ottoman violence 
in Serbia included widespread massacres, robberies and forced baptisms of ordinary Slav 
Muslims as well as Turks; survivors began to flee to Bosnia."52 The Sultan agreed to 
grant Serbia a large measure of autonomy in 1815, after the Serbs had heavily defeated 
one Ottoman army in 1805 and another one, sent from Bosnia, in 1806. But the violence 
was far from its end in the nineteenth century. 
After an insurrection against Turkish rule had begun in Bosnia in August 1875, 
the Ottoman governor acted with ineffective brutality. "During 1876, hundreds ofvillages 
were burnt down and at least 5,000 peasants killed; by the end of the year, the number of 
refugees from Bosnia was probably 100,000 at least, and possibly 250,000."53 The war on 
the Ottoman Empire declared by Serbia and Montenegro in July of the same year could 
only harden the already hostile attitude of the Bosnian authorities toward the Orthodox 
population. In this respect, refugees' reports in early 1877 seemed to indicate for the first 
time the existence of what later would be called religious or ethnic cleansing; such reports 
mentioned "a complete clearing out of the Serb people of Bosnia, for the Turkish 
authorities themselves hunt them down."54 These developments complicated the 
problems ofthe new Austrian administration after 1878. 
5 I Ibid., p. 84. 
52 Ibid., p. 89. 
53 Ibid., p. 132. 
54 Ibid., p. 133. 
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At the outset the new authorities had to face "the need to return more than 
200,000 refugees to their homes,"55 probably mostly Christians. But they also had to deal 
with Muslims fleeing to Turkey - "some who were unwilling on religious grounds to 
live under infidel rule, and others, no doubt, who feared justice or reprisals for the terrible 
things they had done against Christians during the last three years of Ottoman rule."56 
Official figures issued by the Austro-Hungarian government stated that between 1883 and 
1918 56,625 Muslim inhabitants ofBosnia left and 4,042 returned. The Austro-Hungarian 
official figures have been supported by Serb historians but contested by Muslim scholars 
that have claimed a total emigration of 300,000.57 Perhaps a number around 100,000 
looks more likely for net emigration, but it is only a guess. However, even the highest 
estimates pale if compared to the verified figures of the twentieth century. 
Bosnia experienced ethnic cleansing and religious reprisals during the First World 
War. For fear of fifth columnists, Governor Potiorek and his successor, Baron Sarkotic, 
supervised the resettlement of the Serbs from the eastern border region of Bosnia to the 
west of the province and the removal of roughly 5,000 Serb families that were driven 
across the border into Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, between 700 and 2,200 out of a 
total of 3,300 and possibly as many as 5,500 Bosnian insurrection suspects, mainly Serbs, 
are thought to have died in internment camps in Bosnia and Hungary. 58 
Despite having lived in peace with their Muslim neighbors for forty years or more, 
in their triumphalism against Muslims at the end of the First World War, Bosnian Serb 
villagers committed atrocities. By March 1919, around 1,000 Muslim men and 76 women 
had been killed and 270 villages had been pillaged, "with the assistance, passive or active, 
ofthe Serbian troops."59 
Luckily, the devastation was much less than desired by extremist nationalists such 
as Stojan Protic, a minister in the Serbian government, "who had recommended in 1917 
·'solving' the problem of the Bosnian Muslims through a program of forced conversion 
55 Ibid., p. 138. 
56 Ibid., p. 139. 
57 Ibid., p. 139. 
58 Ibid., p. 158. 
59Jbid., p. 162. 
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and massacres."60 However, after its first employment in 1877, the idea that became 
known in the 1990s as "ethnic cleansing" seemed to be already deeply rooted in 
nationalists; and it has played a terrible role in Bosnia ever since. 
For example, the Croat Ustasa ideologists' main concern was to "solve" the 
problem of the large Serb minority (1.9 million out of a total of 6.3 million) in the 
territory of the Independent State of Croatia. Far from being ruled by a docile puppet 
regime subservient to its Axis allies, the Independent State of Croatia was "incomparably 
more determined, more ambitious and more independent than Mussolini's Italy, and more 
violent than Hitler's Reich."61 Its policy- to "convert a third, expel a third and kill a 
third" -toward the approximately two million Serbs "was conceived without the support 
of the Axis powers, and was executed with a ferocity that horrified the Italian army, and 
shocked even the German SS."62 Consequently, on 26 June 1941, Hrvatski List, the 
official newspaper of the Independent State of Croatia published this policy63 while the 
Catholic Church made itself ready to take in some 600,000 converts.64 But "the Ustasa 
had already converted, expelled or murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs by 26 June 
1941."65 As late as May 1941 the Ustasa conducted a mass arrest and shot hundreds of 
Serbs in Mostar. Similar atrocities were committed in other Bosnian towns such as Bihac, 
Brcko, and Doboj; and entire Serb villages in the Sarajevo region were destroyed.66 
Furthermore, also in May 1941, Minister of the Interior Andrija Artukovic "ordered the 
massacre of 4,000 Serbs in his native district."67 All these officials probably followed 
Viktor Gutic's creed. Gutic, the Prefect of Western Bosni~, "was one of the first on 
record to use the term 'cleansing"'68 ("ciscenje" in Serbo-Croat). The Serb villagers 
60 Ibid., p. 164. 
61 Richard West, op. cit., p. 74. 
62 Ibid., p. 74. 
63 Ibid., p. 88. 
64 Ibid., p. 82. 
65 Ibid., p. 93. 
66 Noel Malcolm. op. cit., p. 176. 
67 Richard West, op. cit., p. 92. 
68 Ibid., p. 93. 
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killed more than one thousand Muslims in Bileca and around Visegrad in the next three 
months.69 
In early 1942, extremist nationalists among Serb Cetniks such as Stevan Moljevik 
envisioned the establishment of a "homogenous Serbia" whose expansion to Dalmatia 
was to follow the "cleansing (ciscenje) of that land of all non-Serb elements. The thing to 
do would be to send the offenders on their way: Croats to Croatia, and Muslims to Turkey 
or Albania."70 Cetniks were thus offered the theoretical basis for their virulent anti-
Muslim policy. Along with other local Serb forces they killed many thousands of 
Muslims in the winters of 1941-1942 and 1942-1943, and the summer of 1942. In the 
Foca-Cajnice region alone at least 2,000 Muslims were killed in August 1942 and more 
than 9,000 Muslims, including 8,000 elderly people, women and children, were 
massacred in February 1943.71 
In their tum, the Muslims responded by killing Serbs. After its return to Bosnia 
for "pacification" operations in March 1944, the SS Handzar Division committed 
"indiscriminate reprisals - murders and other crimes - against the local Serb 
population."72 It is likely that there were several thousands of Serb victims. 
The struggle among the Ustasa, the Cetniks, and the Partisans generated a high 
number of victims. It is impossible to disentangle this terrible knot and determine the 
number of victims from each ethnic community generated by the four years of war. "But 
it is clear that at least one million people died, and it is probable that the majority of them 
were Yugoslavs killed by Yugoslavs."73 Probably the atrocities would have continued if 
the end of the Second World War had not put death-revenge cycles on hold for about 
forty-five years in a communist Yugoslavia that would admit no "nationality problem." 
Tito pacified all parties in his own way. He ordered the indiscriminate killing of 
more than 18,000 Bosnian Croats, Serbs and Muslims after the British had sent them 
back to Yugoslavia from Allied-controlled Austria. "Altogether it has been estimated that 
up to 250,000 people were killed by Tito's mass shooting, forced death marches and 
69 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 176. 
70 Ibid., p. 179. 
71 Ibid., p. 188. 
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concentration camps in the period 1945-1946. "74 Power was much more important to him 
than reconciliation. The indiscriminate killing of thousands of people signaled the 
beginning of the new Communist experiment. Tito intended to define a unique Yugoslav 
people by replacing ethnic identity with class identity. The experiment would fail 
painfully soon after the death of its initiator. 
73 Ibid., p. 174. 
74 1bid., p. 193. 
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III.RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. BOSNIA FROM TITO'S DEATH TO THE 1991 ELECTIONS 
After Tito died in 1980, events in Yugoslavia fulfilled the prophecy his enemies 
had made nine years earlier: "When Tito goes the whole thing will collapse."1 Tito's 
grand scheme had involved a threefold strategy: self-management of the economy, 
brotherhood and unity of various nationalities, and non-alignment in foreign policy.2 His 
strategy might have been successful had not two major processes, one internal and one 
external, intervened. 
The former concerns the failure of the Yugoslav economy throughout the 1980s. 
"The whole Titoist economic system - which has been aptly described as 'Self-
Mismanagement"'3 -had only been able to function on borrowed money. Based on 
loans, giant factories had been built throughout the entire country. This system had 
worked for years, but the interest payments gradually suffocated it. The economic 
breakdown became general in the 1980s. However, such giant factories could hardly be 
efficient and therefore they "would have anyway run at a loss even without the interest 
payments on the loans which had financed their creation."4 
Thousands of workers demonstrated against the austerity measures the Yugoslav 
central authorities, such as the Mikulik government, attempted to undertake in July 
1988.5 According to Noel Malcolm, "the long-term legacy of Tito's economic policies 
had been to create an increasingly discontented and impoverished population - the 
perfect place for demagogues to get to work, stirring up the politics of resentment."6 
Indeed, Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic did their best to harness this genuine 
discontent and exploit it for their own purposes. Their opportunism thus crucially 
1 Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Carroll & GrafPublishers, Inc., 
1994), p. 318. 
2 Jolene Kay Jesse, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs. Case 471: "Humanitarian Aid in the Midst of 
Conflict: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Former Yugoslavia" (Washington 
D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1996), p. 2. 
3 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 210. 
41bid., p. 219. 
5 Ibid., p. 211. 
61bid., p. 210. 
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contributed to the failure of Tito's policies and to the subsequent violent collapse of 
Yugoslavia. 
The latter process intervened as a result of the major changes generated by the end 
ofthe Cold War. During the Cold War years, Western interests in Yugoslavia had been 
clearly defined. Yugoslavia was seen as a de facto ally against Soviet expansion in the 
Balkans, and it was thus important that its integrity be preserved. Even Germany, which 
by 1991 strongly supported Yugoslavia's disintegration by recognizing the independence 
of Croatia and Slovenia, had shared this opinion. "Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed this 
policy during a visit to Yugoslavia in the summer of 1985, when he proclaimed 
Germany's 'great interest in maintaining the internal and external stability of 
Yugoslavia. '"7 But in early 1989 the German view changed because Yugoslavia no 
longer enjoyed the same geopolitical importance it had had from a Western prospective 
during the Cold War. 
As for the Americans, a number of their foremost experts on the Balkans, such as 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, shared the view "that the traditional 
American approach to Yugoslavia no longer made sense."8 Indeed, "the preservation of 
the country's unity and territorial integrity, which had been a matter of high priority 
within the Cold War context, was now subordinate to democratization."9 However, the 
violent disintegration of the country demonstrated that "unity and democracy were the 
Siamese twins of Yugoslavia's fate. The loss of one meant the other would die."IO 
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) had split, owing to quarrels at 
its January 1990 congress. The communist party created by Tito had breathed its last. The 
LCY never met again and consequently, Yugoslavia soon plunged into free democratic 
elections. Unfortunately, "democratization, the standard medicine believed capable of 
7 Saadia Touval, "Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler 
Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International 
Conflict (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 404. 
8 Ibid., p. 404. 
9 Ibid., p. 404. 
10 Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 74 No.2 (March1April1995), p. 6. 
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curing most of the world's ills,"ll did not work this time. In a genuine test of ethnic 
loyalty, ethnic parties won power in all the republics except Macedonia. 
Bosnia voted in November 1990, but the vote painfully disappointed all those who 
still desired a peaceful solution to the crises. "Loyalty towards nation proved stronger 
than all other loyalties."l2 Indeed, the 99 Muslims, 85 Serbs, 49 Croats and 7 
"Yugoslavs" holding the 240 seats in the Bosnian assemblyl3 roughly matched the 
proportions of the Bosnian population as a whole ( 44 per cent Muslim, 31 per cent Serb 
and 17 per cent Croat). Consequently, Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader, won the most 
votes and became president. 
As Noel Malcolm observed, "A coalition government was formed, but it was soon 
obvious that the three national parties not only had mutually exclusive programs, but that 
they actually represented incompatible national ideologies."l4 Indeed, as Alexa Djilas 
pointed out, while "Muslims imagined Bosnia as an independent state in which they 
should predominate ... the Serbs, for their part, wanted Bosnia to stay inside Yugoslavia 
and increasingly demanded a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs."l5 Both programs stood in 
contrast with the Croatian maximal fantasy, which was to incorporate the whole of 
Bosnia into Croatia. The more realistic Croats planned to take only those territories of 
Bosnia with a Croat majority and integrate them into Croatia. The day the irreconcilable 
differences among the three groups would drag Bosnia into a civil war had become just a 
matter of time. As Warren Zimmermann put it, not only was Yugoslavia "breaking up 
into different power centers, but each local region was developing a nationalist ideology, 
each different from the other. The age of naked nationalism had begun."16 
B. BOSNIAN INDEPENDENCE PROCESS 
Placed between the hammer and the anvil of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, 
the Bosnian Muslims (sometime called "Bosniaks") strengthened their own nationalism 
II Saadia Touval, op. cit., p. 404. 
12 Aleksa Djilas, "The Nation That Wasn't," The New Republic (September 21, 1992), p. 30. 
13 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 222. 
14 Aleksa Djilas, op. cit., p. 31. 
15 Ibid., p. 31. 
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and stood for the preservation of Bosnia as a distinctive and independent entity. The 
establishment of Bosnian independence was a long and extremely violent process, which 
encompassed several years between its initial de jure and later still questionable de facto 
stages. 
To explain this process, this chapter provides a two-fold survey of the main events 
in the Bosnian crisis. The first part covers the military actions of the primary warring 
parties and the second focuses on the interventions conducted by external powers and the 
political actions undertaken by these powers. 
The analysis considers the four stages of the Bosnian independence process. The 
first stage covers the developments in 1991 and early 1992, when the Bosnian crisis was 
still limited to Yugoslav territory. The second stage focuses on the period from mid-1992 
to early 1994, which was characterized by Serbian military successes and Western 
failures in imposing peace in Bosnia. The third stage covers the period from mid-1994 to 
late 1995 and encompasses the shift in the fates of the warring parties. Finally, the 
analysis considers the post-Dayton peace agreement developments. 
1. The Process of Bosnian de jure Independence (1991-April1992) 
a. Bosnian Political-Military Developments 
In September 1991 the fighting between Croatia and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia spilled over into Bosnia. The "Serb Autonomous Regions," large parts of 
the Bosnian territory in which Bosnian Serbs demanded secession from Bosnia, asked the 
Yugoslav federal army to intervene to "protect" them. Well-armed federal troops were 
immediately deployed. Under the new circumstances, the Bosnian assembly began to 
seriously debate the idea of declaring Bosnian sovereignty. 
On 15 October 1991 the Parliament of Bosnia Herzegovina declared the 
republic's sovereignty. The declaration was not intended to give Bosnia full independence 
but only "legislative sovereignty within Yugoslavia, so that it would be able, in legal 
theory at least, to pass laws overriding the federal army's rights to use its territory."17 
I6w z· · 7 arren mnnerrnann, op. Cit., p. . 
17 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 228. 
28 
The Bosnian Serbs did not accept it, however. The Bosnian Serb deputies 
walked out of the 15 October 1991 session and responded by establishing the "Assembly 
of the Serbian Nation of Bosnia Herzegovina" on 24 October. Furthermore, on 9 January 
1992, the newly established Bosnian Serb assembly declared an "Autonomous Republic 
ofthe Serbian People of Bosnia Herzegovina." The new "autonomous republic" naturally 
contradicted the Bosnian Muslim will for independence. In response, President 
Izetbegovic called for a referendum regarding Bosnia's full independence. 
In the referendum held on 29 February 1992, 99.4 per cent ofthe Bosnians 
voted for independence, although the true proportion was probably 63 per cent, as most of 
the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote.18 Bosnia nonetheless proclaimed its independence 
on 3 March 1992. 
The declaration of independence escalated the crisis. Fighting erupted 
"between Muslim and Croatian irregulars, on the one hand, and Yugoslav People's Army 
(JNA) troops and Serbian irregulars, on the other."19 On 30 March 1992, the federal army 
chief, General Adzic, announced that "his army was prepared to intervene to protect 
Serbs against 'open aggression."'20 As with the Serb irregulars, even before 30 March, 
the federal troops had apparently already taken the initiative in the bombing and shooting 
in Banja Luka, Bosanski Brod and Mostar. Indeed, at this early stage, the most sinister 
development was the arrival of Arkan's paramilitary forces in Bijeljina, after they had 
completed the "clean-up" operations in Vukovar. By 4 April, it had already been reported 
that there were corpses in the streets of Bijeljina. "Ethnic cleansing" was regularly 
reported in the Bosnian crisis thereafter. Unfortunately, when faced with the Bosnian 
crisis, the principal external powers reacted slowly and indecisively. 
b. International Political-Military Developments 
On 6 April 1992, the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia's 
independence. A day later, the United States also recognized Bosnian independence. On 
the same day, in support of the new independent Bosnia, UN Security Council Resolution 
18 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 12. 
19 Ibid., p. 12. 
20 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 236. 
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(UNSCR) 749 authorized deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). If the 
external powers had intervened earlier, they might have prevented the escalation of the 
crisis. But several calls for EC observers or UN troops had been previously denied. 
First, on 11 September 1991, the EC had turned down President 
Izetbegovic's request for EC observers and the establishment of a demilitarized zone 
along the Croatian border. The EC thus missed a significant opportunity, since the request 
was made soon after the fighting in Croatia had spilled over into Bosnia. Instead, with an 
unprecedented lack of perspective, UNSCR 713 of 25 September 1991 called for a 
complete arms embargo on Yugoslavia. This initiative would have sinister effects at least 
until mid-1994, if not until the end of the war in Bosnia in late 1995. 
Second, on 23 November 1991, after the first cease-fire brokered by the 
UN had come into force and Croatia had agreed to allow UN peacekeepers in the combat 
zones, the UNSC turned down Bosnia's request for the deployment of UN troops on its 
territory. It was another wasted opportunity, as it occurred after the Parliament of Bosnia 
had declared the republic's sovereignty on 15 October and the Bosnian Serbs had 
responded by forming their own assembly on 24 October. 
Altogether, after the violence had erupted, the actions undertaken by the 
principal external powers in Bosnia were far from matching the high intensity of the 
fighting between the warring parties. However, the external powers had at least finally 
begun to pay attention to the war in Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were 
thus no longer alone in their fight. 
2. Western Failure (early 1992-early 1994) 
a. Bosnian Political-Military Developments 
Although the leading external powers had become interested in the fate of 
Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs would have by far the strongest forces in the conflict for at 
least two more years. With the initial direct and later indirect help of the JNA, together 
with Serb paramilitary groups, such as Arkan's Tigers, Mirko Jovic's "White Eagles," 
and Seselj's Cetniks, the Bosnian Serbs constantly took the initiative in the military 
operations during the second stage. Consequently, "using the advantage of surprise and 
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overwhelming superiority, the federal army and its paramilitary adjuncts carved out 
within the first five to six weeks an area of conquest covering more than 60 per cent of 
the entire Bosnian territory."21 
Because new Yugoslav federation composed up of Serbia and Montenegro 
was established on 27 April 1992, the JNA ceased, in theory, its direct support of the 
Bosnian Serbs in May 1992. Forced by the logic of the newly established situation, 
President Milosevic "announced that he would withdraw those soldiers in the army in 
Bosnia who were citizens of the new two-republic Yugoslavia; those who were Bosnian 
Serbs would be transferred, together with all the armaments and supplies, to the so-called 
'Serb Republic,' and placed under the command of General Ratko Mladic."22 This 
cosmetic exercise proved successful. As a consequence, prominent Western politicians, 
such as the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, began to describe the "fighting in 
Bosnia as a 'civil war. "'23 
Under such circumstances, the main opposition to the Bosnian Serbs' 
advance came from 15,000 Croat fighters of the "Croat Defense Council" (HVO) and 
15,000 Croat regular army troops. In late May 1992 they began a counter-offensive that 
"after more than a month of fighting, succeeded in pushing the federal army forces away 
from the Mostar region."24 Building on this initial success, on 16 June 1992, Presidents 
Izetbegovic and Tudjman signed a formal military alliance between Bosnia and Croatia 
that would legitimize the use of both regular Croat army troops and HVO combatants. 
Also, a Croat-Muslimjoint defense committee was establish~d on 23 September 1992. 
Yet the Croat-Muslim cooperation in the military field was far from being 
fully paralleled in the political realm. Consistent with his pursuit of independence, 
President Izetbegovic turned down Croat initiatives regarding a confederation of Bosnia 
and Croatia. In response, in early July 1992, Mate Bohan, the leader of the Bosnian 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), "declared the creation of the 'Croat Community of 
2l Ibid., p. 238. 
22lbid., p. 238. 
23 Ibid., p. 239. 
24 Ibid., p. 240. 
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Herceg-Bosnia,' and a kind of Croat Autonomous Region,"25 in the Croat-controlled 
areas of Bosnia (about one-third of total area).26 Naturally, the Bosnian government 
declared that these entities were illegal. 
The weak Croat-Bosnian political cooperation generated two major 
negative outcomes in the long run. Firstly, their combined military capabilities opposed to 
the Bosnian Serb forces were too weak. Secondly, the Croat and Muslim forces 
eventually turned against each other. Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs were able to 
achieve military mastery at the expense of the Croat and·Muslim forces. 
After the Bosnian Serbs had heavily shelled Sarajevo on 21 April and 12 
May 1992, the Croat and Muslim militias in Travnik and Pozor turned against each other 
and some clashes took place in mid-October. Croats gained control over three cities, and 
28,000 people fled. Seizing the opportunity, the Bosnian Serbs took control of the 
Bosanski Brod region on the border between Croatia and Bosnia, and 8,000 refugees 
escaped to Croatia later in the same month. Thus by the end of 1992, the Serbs controlled 
70 per cent of Bosnia; the Croats, at war with the Bosnian government, held 20 per cent; 
and the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government administered only the remaining 10 per 
cent of the country.27 The overall military situation would remain essentially unchanged 
during the next year. 
In early 1993, the Serbs were initially "pushed back in several areas, 
especially the Bratunac region of the Drina valley."28 In April 1993, however, they took 
the military initiative and stepped up their offensives around Muslim enclaves in eastern 
Bosnia designated as Muslim areas under the Vance-Owen peace plan.29 On 18 April 
1993, a cease-fire gave the Serbs control over Srebrenica, and UNPROFOR was obliged 
to evacuate 30,000 Muslims. Later in the month, keeping 300,000 Muslims under 
constant siege, the Serbs strengthened their offensive against Bihac and also intensified 
25 Ibid., p. 241. 
26 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 13. 
27 Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 
p. 317. 
28 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 249. 
29 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 14. 
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their operations against Goradze, Gradacac, and Tuzla.30 The resulting territorial gains 
would remain within the Serb-conquered area of eastern Bosnia.31 
The Bosnian Croats and Muslims kept on fighting against each other for 
most of 1993. In February 1993, "Muslim forces in Gornji Zakufwere besieged by HVO 
soldiers, and in the area between Vitez and Kiseljak both Muslim and Croat militias 
engaged in what one report described as 'freelance ethnic cleansing."'32 By April 1993, 
there were outbreaks of heavy fighting between the Croats and Muslims in the Travnik-
Vitez-Zenica area of central Bosnia.33 However, the cease-fire the Croats and Muslims 
signed on 29 April 199334 would not prevent their forces from fighting each other in 
central Bosnia and particularly in the Mostar area for the remainder of the year.35 
Indeed, another major conflict between non-Serbs took place in 
northwestern Bosnia, where the Bihac pocket, a predominantly Muslim area, had become 
the power base of two contending forces. There was the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army, 
on the one hand, and the large personal following of Fikret Abdic, a famous local 
politician, on the other. The crisis began on 27 September 1993, when "Abdic proclaimed 
the 'Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia"'36 and thus destabilized this area of 
considerable strategic importance. The crisis favored the Serbs by creating a split in 
Muslim unity that contributed greatly to the overall destabilization of Bosnia and to 
Croat-Muslim military weakness. 
Conversely, neither the arms embargo the UN had introduced in 
September 1991 nor the actions intended to end the crisis that major external powers had 
undertaken would significantly degrade the strength of the Serb military. The embargo 
had been introduced against Yugoslavia as a whole in 1991, when it was formally a single 
country. However, since the situation in 1992 was completely different, with several 
successor states in contention, the embargo openly favored the Serbs. While Yugoslavia 
30 Ibid., p. 15. 
31 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 249. 
32 Ibid., p. 248. 
33 Ibid., p. 249. 
34 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 15. 
35 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 254. 
36 Ibid., p. 255. 
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was now disintegrating, among all the fonner Yugoslav republics, Serbia held most of the 
annaments and equipment stockpiles of the former JNA. Also, most of the key 
annaments factories in Bosnia were located in predominantly Serb areas. (For example, 
the Bosnian Serbs had seized the artillery shell factory in the Vogosca district outside 
Sarajevo at the beginning of the war.37) 
Therefore, the equipment the wamng parties held during this stage 
perfectly mirrored the new strategic and territorial situation. Estimates in September 1992 
indicated that non-Serb Bosnians "possessed two tanks and two armored personnel 
carriers (APCs), while the Serb army in Bosnia had 300 tanks, 200 APCs, 800 artillery 
pieces and 40 aircraft. A later estimate, in June 1993, was that the arms captured by 
Bosnians included up to 40 tanks and 30 APCs, together with a larger number of light 
artillery pieces; the Croat forces were thought to have roughly 50 tanks and more than 
100 artillery pieces."38 By early 1994 it was also clear that, for their part, the major 
external powers had both militarily and diplomatically done too little to create a more 
balanced situation and effectively end the ongoing war in Bosnia. 
b. International Political-Military Developments 
On 16 May 1992, the UN withdrew most of the peacekeeping troops 
already deployed to Sarajevo as a result ofUNSCR 749. This was partly because of the 
intensive attack Sarajevo had come under, but it was also because of the personal 
initiative of the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Indeed, UNPROFOR had 
proved too weak to properly deal with the Bosnian war. According to figures released by 
the UNHCR and local Red Cross Committees, during the refugee crisis in July 1992, 
UNPROFOR could not help the 2,500,000 people displaced in all of Yugoslavia, with 
10,000 Bosnians displaced daily.39 
In response, on 13 August 1992, UNSCR 770 authorized "all measures 
necessary" to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid, authorizing, in other words, the use of 
37 1bid., p. 243. 
38 Ibid., p. 243. 
39 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 13. 
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force as a last resort. "This was the kind of wording that allowed President Bush to 
pursue the Persian GulfWar,"40 but this time the resolution was not implemented. 
To the same end, on 10 September 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked the 
UNSC to enlarge UNPROFOR's mandate to include the protection of humanitarian 
assistance. On 14 September, he requested better protection of aid shipments. The UN 
Security Council approved the expansion of UNPROFOR by up to 6,000 personnel, but 
UNPROFOR was still too weak to implement any UNSC resolution. Consequently, the 
Serbs ignored a 6 September 1992 communique of the Permanent Conference on 
Yugoslavia announcing that all heavy weaponry was to be placed under UN supervision 
by 12 September. Similarly, UNSCR 781, which banned military flights over Bosnia, 
would be immediately defied by the Serbs. Altogether, the UN' s intervention continued to 
be ineffective in 1993. 
On 6 April 1993, UNSCR 824 declared Tuzla, Zepa, Goradze, Bihac and 
Srebrenica "safe areas" and ordered all parties to ensure that they remained free from 
"armed attacks or any other hostile act."41 Later, on 12 April, based on UNSCR 816, 
NATO began to enforce the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia. The Serbs nonetheless defied the 
UN once again by taking control of Srebrenica on 18 April and stepping up their 
offensives against Bihac, Goradze, and Tuzla on 27 April. 
According to Noel Malcolm, "The final death-warrant for Bosnia was 
written on 22 May [1993] in Washington, at a gathering of the foreign ministers of 
Britain, France, Spain, Russia and the USA."42 The resulting "Washington Accord" 
pledged the use of NATO air strikes to protect UN forces, but not Bosnian civilians, in 
the "safe areas."43 Consequently, on 4 June, UNSCR 836 allowed UNPROFOR to use 
force to reply to attacks against the six "safe areas"44 but only if the UN troops 
themselves came under attack and not if Muslims were shot.45 The major external powers 
had admitted that they were still unwilling to pay the prize for changing the Bosnian 
40 Stanley Meisler, op. cit., p. 313. 
41 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 14. 
42 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 250. 
43 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 15. 
44 1bid., p. 15. 
45 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 250. 
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status quo. This was also the case diplomatically. By early 1994, there was a long list of 
unsuccessful peace initiatives; and the peace plans had merely mirrored the military 
situation on the ground. 
The Permanent Conference on Yugoslavia that had opened in Geneva on 3 
September 1992 was co-chaired by the EC negotiator, Lord Owen, and the UN negotiator, 
Cyrus Vance. In late October 1992 the two negotiators produced the first detailed 
proposal for a political settlement in Bosnia. It was formally issued in January 1993, 
when all three warring parties met in Geneva to negotiate. Put together originally by 
Martti Ahtisaari, a Finnish diplomat, the plan called for turning Bosnia into a set of ten 
autonomous provinces: "three dominated by Muslims, three by Serbs, three by Croats, 
and the tenth (Sarajevo) administered jointly by the three ethnic groups. Under this 
arrangement, the Serbs would have had 43 per cent of the territory, the Muslims 36 per 
cent, and the Croats 21 per cent."46 The plan was immediately accepted by the Croats 
and, under American pressure, signed by President Izetbegovic on 25 March 1993. But 
the Serbs refused to accept it. The March 1993 offensive had given them hopes for more. 
The Serbs' assessment proved accurate. After the rejection of the Vance-
Owen plan, Lord Owen and the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thordvald Stoltenberg, 
drew up a new peace plan. Bosnia was now "to be carved up into a three-part 
'confederation' ofmini-republics, the borders ofwhich would, to some extent, legitimize 
the military conquests of the previous two years."47 The plan did not respect the 44/31117 
per cent ethnic ratio among the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. It allocated the 
Bosnian Serbs 53 per cent of the Bosnian territory, the Bosnian Muslims 30 per cent and 
the Bosnian Croats 17 per cent. Neither the Muslims nor the Croats could accept this 
peace plan, while the Serbs replied by coming up with some unacceptable proposals 
regarding a divided Sarajevo. In effect, it was simply another peace plan that undermined 
the chances for a diplomatically achieved settlement in Bosnia. 
The military situation on the ground and the failure of international 
diplomatic efforts to bring a peaceful solution made late 1993 and early 1994 the nadir of 
46 Stanley Meisler, op. cit., p. 319. 
47 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 253. 
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Bosnia's fortunes. Western governments seemed to be planning to withdraw their 
UNPROFOR troops "as a recognition that all their policies had failed."48 Yet 1994 was to 
be the turning point in Bosnia's fate. 
3. Toward Conflict Resolution in Bosnia (early 1994-late 1995) 
a. Bosnian Political-Military Developments 
There were four noteworthy military developments in 1994. First, on 1 7 
February 1994, the Bosnian Serbs executed a large-scale withdrawal of equipment from 
around Sarajevo following a Russian intervention.49 Second, in August the Fifth Corps of 
the Bosnian army succeeded in defeating the forces of Fikret Abdic and driving them out 
of the Bihac pocket. Third, in October the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian army broke out of 
the Bihac pocket and achieved large territorial gains (several hundred square kilometers). 
Fourth, in November the joint offensive of the Seventh Corps of the Bosnian army and 
the HVO against the Serbs in central Bosnia led to the capture of the town of Kupres.50 
Yet, although they had been partially and temporarily deprived of the military initiative 
and thus, for the first time since the beginning of the war in 1992, their vulnerability had 
been demonstrated, in 1994 the Bosnian Serbs definitely were still stronger than their 
Bosnian Croat and Muslim opponents. 
On 5 February 1994, the Bosnian Serbs killed sixty-eight and injured 197 
civilians during a mortar attack on Sarajevo. In late March, they also heavily bombed the 
"safe areas." On 28 March, the bombardment of the "safe area" of Goradze killed thirty 
and wounded one hundred and thirty-two civilians. But for Goradze this was just the 
beginning of its suffering since, after heavy fighting, it effectively fell to Serb forces on 
22 April1994. 
The second half of 1994 witnessed two major Serb offensive actions. The 
first took place in September, when, using Serb troops from both Bosnia and Croatia, 
General Ratko Mladic attacked the Bihac pocket. Also, in addition to their military 
48 Ibid., p. 255. 
49 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 16 
50 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 259. 
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offensive, to starve the civilian population into submission, the Serbs also enforced such 
an efficient blockade of Bihac that by November, 131 UN convoys had been turned back 
by their roadblocks. 51 The offensive that followed the blockade was once again directed 
against the Bihac pocket. It lasted for almost all ofNovember. 
By December 1994, the warring parties had reached a de facto stalemate. 
"The events had illustrated both the strengths and weakness of the Bosnian government 
forces. In manpower and morale they were now superior to the Serb army; if they were 
fully supported by Croat heavy weaponry, they could make significant gains against the 
Serbs."52 Because Serb military power had declined while Muslim military power had 
insufficiently increased, the former lacked enough forces to complete its conquests, while 
the latter lacked the strength to decisively counter-attack. Consequently, in December 
1994, both sides were happy to sign the Carter-negotiated four-month "total cessation of 
hostilities."53 They "had accepted this cease-fire only because they needed more time to 
build up their forces for the spring campaign. "54 Yet the Serbs were still stronger and 
better equipped militarily. According to estimates made by the Croatian General Karl 
Gornisek in October 1994, the Bosnian Muslims had 45 tanks (the number had 
significantly increased, from 2 in September 1992 and about 40 in June 1993), while the 
Serbs had 400. The military situation on the ground was, however, to change crucially in 
1995. It reflected the completion ofthe political changes initiated in February 1994. 
The end of the four-month cease-fire in 1995 found the Serbs, on the one 
hand, and the Croats and the Muslims, on the other, in an unprecedented struggle 
consisting of a long sequence of significant blows. In April and May 1995, the Bosnian 
Serbs vigorously attacked the Bihac pocket and the Croat-held sector north of the Serb-
held "corridor" in northeastern Bosnia. The Bosnian government forces responded by 
making significant gains around Travnik and in the mountains south of Sarajevo. 
On 1 and 2 May 1995, in an extremely successful military operation, 
Croatian army units restored the Croatian government's control over the entire Serb-held 
51 Ibid., p. 259. 
52 Ibid., p. 260. 
53 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 18. 
54 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 261. 
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area of Western Slavonia. The Serbs responded with one of the heaviest artillery 
bombardments of Sarajevo. In late May, the Serbs also conducted artillery bombardments 
of all the UN "safe areas. 
They pounded the Srebrenica city center with half a dozen well-placed 
rounds and lofted into Tuzla a mortar shell that exploded among a crowd 
of young people . . . killing seventy-five teenagers (whose shattered 
remains went unobserved by any television camera and thus remained, 
unlike the celebrated sixty-eight dead of Sarajevo, a little-known 
statistic). 55 
In mid-June 1995 a large-scale offensive ofthe Bosnian army attempted to 
break through Serb lines around Sarajevo and took some territory. "But the main Serb 
positions surrounding the city were too well dug in to be dislodged by an army which was 
still so under-equipped in the crucial area of heavy weaponry."56 Furthermore, the Serbs 
retaliated by shelling civilian areas in Sarajevo. 
It was now the Serbs' tum to seize the initiative by capturing two of the 
UN "safe areas." On 11 July 1995, they took Srebrenica. Two weeks after taking 
Srebrenica, they captured Zepa, another UN "safe area." The Croats struck back on 5 
August, when a well-planned and rapid offensive gave them almost complete control of 
the entire Krajina region. The collapse of the Serb strength in the Krajina region must 
have definitely had a damaging effect on Serb morale in Bosnia. However, the Serbs 
retaliated in their usual way. On 28 August 1995, a Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo killed 
thirty-seven people and wounded eighty-eight. This action helped to provoke intervention 
by the major external powers. 
In September 1995, a combined operation by Croat and Bosnian 
government forces brought the Bosnian Serbs close to defeat. The Croats and the Bosnian 
Muslims made dramatic territorial gains in northwestern Bosnia. The Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims took "Donji Vakuf on the 13th and Jajce on the following day; by the 17th they 
controlled the road connecting Jajce with Bihac, and were pressing on towards the Serb 
55 Mark Danner, "Bosnia: Breaking the Machine," The New York Review of Books, February 19, 1998, p. 
41. 
56 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 263. 
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stronghold of Banja Luka, attacking the key towns of Sanski Most and Prijedor as they 
did so."57 On 19 September 1995, when the American and British governments were 
putting pressure on the Croats to halt the offensive, the Bosnian Serbs had already lost 
roughly 15 per cent of the total area of the country. Given this dramatic change in 
Bosnia's circumstances, the Serbs were now willing to begin the peace talks. The general 
agreement announced at Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995 was the result of a long 
political process that had begun in early 1994. The gradually deeper military involvement 
of the interested external powers in Bosnia proceeded in parallel with this political 
process. 
b. International Political-Military Developments 
The 5 February 1994 mortar attack on Sarajevo helped to bring about a 
fundamental change in the attitude of the United States and other NATO countries. It was 
a turning point that initiated two major developments with crucial effects on Bosnia's 
fate. 
First, on the initiative of the United States and France, NATO policy on 
Bosnia took a new and positive course. The meeting of NATO ambassadors on 9 
February 1994 led to an agreement to implement-any future UN request for air strikes. 
Furthermore, NATO declared a 20 km "exclusion zone" for heavy weaponry around 
Sarajevo and warned the Serb commanders that air strikes would be conducted against 
them, unless their forces were withdrawn by midnight on 20 February. The Bosnian Serbs 
complied. Following a Russian intervention they executed on 17 February a large-scale 
withdrawal of equipment from around Sarajevo. The external powers had for the first 
time made their threats regarding the use of force credible. Further developments in 1994 
were not, however, consistent with that early enthusiasm. 
Second, a new American policy not only ended the Croat-Muslim conflict 
but also de facto lifted the arms embargo on Bosnia. An important role in ending the 
conflict was played by the "Council of Bosnian-Herzegovian Croats." On 6 February 
1994, the Council declared itself in favor of preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia; 
57 Ibid., pp. 266-267. 
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and the new course of Bosnian Croat-Muslim relations it thus established made possible 
the cease-fire agreement the Bosnian government and Croat forces signed on 23 February 
1994. 
It was only the persuasive "assistance" of the U.S. government that made 
the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims conclude a formal political agreement. The 
agreement stipulated the creation of a Muslim ("Bosniak")-Croat Federation58 and the 
"preliminary agreement on the establishment of a confederation between the Bosnian 
federation and Croatia. "59 According to Michael McAdams' account, "In March 1994, US 
President Bill Clinton presided over a forced marriage of Croatia and Bosnia into a 
federation. For both it was a marriage of convenience resented by many in the populations 
of both sides."60 The agreement nonetheless ended the war between the Croats and the 
Muslims in central Bosnia. 
Owing to the same Croat-Muslim agreement, the arms embargo on Bosnia 
informally ceased to exist in the spring of 1994. In April 1994, President Tudjman had 
asked US Ambassador Galbraith about the U.S. government's position should Croatia 
resume transshipment of weapons to Bosnia. Galbraith replied that on the matter of 
weapon transshipments he had received "no instructions." This was the "green light" 
Tudjman had been waiting for. Two years later, in their report on this matter, U.S. 
senators concluded that "with the 'no instructions' decision American policy had in fact 
'changed from one of telling other countries that the United Nations arms embargo must 
be obeyed to one of looking the other way as arms flowed from Iran and other countries 
into Bosnia and Croatia. '"61 
Consequently, m the spring of 1994 heavy unmarked cargo airplanes 
began to transport crates of assault rifles, rocket launchers, grenades, and ammunition to 
Zagreb. Their journey had begun in the vast and largely American-stocked arms 
warehouses of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A customary third was put aside by the 
Croats as a fee for their serving as the middleman. Then convoys were set for Bosnia. By 
58 Ibid., p. 256. 
59 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 16. 
60 Michael C. McAdams, Croatia: Myth and Reality. The Final Chapter (Arcadia, California: CIS 
Monographs, 1997), p. 34. 
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mid-1994, this initially secret airlift had grown into a highly organized operation that 
would carry tons of arms from Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as Iran.62 The Serbs were 
nonetheless still stronger militarily and therefore an enduring peace settlement was not 
feasible yet. 
In May 1994, the interested external powers came up with a new proposal 
regarding a peaceful solution for the ongoing war in Bosnia. "A 'Contact Group,' 
consisting of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States put forward a new 
'peace plan. '"63 The plan preserved the integrity of Bosnia in theory, but in fact it would 
divide the country's territory, with 51 per cent going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 
49 per cent to the Serbs. The Muslims and the Croats eventually accepted it as the lesser 
evil. Indeed, 51 per cent going to the Muslim-Croat Federation was much better than the 
"Plan B" of the Contact Group diplomats, which might have allowed the Serb-controlled 
half of Bosnia to make separate confederation arrangements with Serbia.64 
The Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan in a "referendum" staged on 19 and 
20 August 1994. This rejection displeased the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, 
who believed that the Contact Group plan gave the Bosnian Serbs everything they 
needed.65 Had he been able to make the Bosnian Serbs accept it in 1994, the Bosnians 
would have had their "Dayton" peace settlement much earlier. However, it was now clear 
that real progress could be made only on the battlefield and not in the negotiating 
chamber. 
Unfortunately, after their initial success on 17 February 1994, the 
interested external powers found themselves divided between and within NATO and the 
UN regarding the use of force during the rest of 1994. Consequently, with the exception 
of the NATO air strikes on 5 August and on 21, 23, and 25 November, the external 
powers did not do much for the remainder of 1994. Even when Serb artillery bombarded 
the UN safe areas, "the UN took no measures to fulfill its mandate, which required it 
61 Mark Danner, op. cit., p. 43. 
62 Ibid., p. 42. 
63 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p. 259. 
64 Ibid., p. 258. 
65 Ibid., p. 258. 
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(under Security Council resolution 836) to 'deter attacks against the safe areas."'66 The 
400 UN hostages the Serbs reportedly detained on 27 November 1994 in a bid to deter 
further air strikes put the advocates of bombing in a delicate situation.67 Indeed, on 6 
December 1994, the Serbs were still holding 311 UN staff in detention.68 
The UN hostages also played an important role in 1995. On 25 May 1995, 
after the Serbs had defied the UN ultimatum that demanded that they cease firing on 
Sarajevo, NATO air strikes hit two ammunition bunkers near the Bosnian Serb "capital" 
of Pale.69 This time, besides conducting artillery bombardments on UN safe areas, the 
Serbs initiated what would be called the "hostage crisis" by taking hostage more than 360 
UN personnel and chaining them to the ammunition bunker doors and other potential 
targets. Their policy worked, at least in one respect: NATO air strikes ceased. The air 
strikes resumed three moJ?.ths later, however, under totally different circumstances. 
On 30 August 1995, after the Serbs defied the ultimatum the UN and 
NATO had issued as a result of the Serb mortar attack on a Sarajevo market two days 
before, NATO began its Deliberate Force air operation. By now, the UN-NATO "dual 
key" system of decision-making had been streamlined and the last group of UN troops 
had just recently been withdrawn from Goradze. The 3,000 NATO sorties eliminated the 
Serb air defenses, destroyed large amounts of ammunition, and forced General Mladic to 
withdraw most of his weaponry from the Sarajevo "exclusion zone." The Deliberate 
Force Operation had been preceded by the Croats' highly effective offensive against the 
Serb-held Krajina in early August and, in its turn, NATO's air operation preceded the 
extremely effective combined offensive of the Croat and Bosnian government forces 
against the Serbs in north-western Bosnia in mid-September. Having been abandoned by 
Milosevic, the Bosnian Serbs were now ready to negotiate about the. previous Contact 
Group plan. Yet it was Milosevic who eventually signed the Dayton peace agreement that 
would bring Bosnia peace. 
66 Ibid., 259. 
67 Jolene Kay Jesse, op. cit., p. 17. 
68 Ibid., p. 18. 
69 Mark Danner, op. cit., p. 41. 
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At an initial meeting in Geneva on 8 September 1995 the belligerents 
accepted the same territorial division proposed earlier: 51 per cent for the Croat-Muslim 
Federation and 49 per cent for the Bosnian Serbs. An accord at a follow-up meeting in 
New York on 26 September included the preservation of both the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and the "Serb Republic." "The tension between these two conflicting 
tendencies - de facto division, on the one hand, and de jure preservation of Bosnia on 
the other -"70 had thus been accepted. This tension persisted in the American-led 
negotiations in Dayton, which announced the conclusion of a general agreement on 21 
November 1995. It included "a territorial settlement (maintaining the 51/49 per cent 
division between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic), a new 
constitution, various mechanisms for the protection of human rights, the return of 
refugees and the construction of an international force, under NATO leadership, of 
60,000 troops to supervise the cessation of hostilities."?! Following the signing of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in Paris on 14 
December 1995, UNSCR 1031 on 15 December 1995 established the legal foundation of 
the year-long NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). 
C. POST-DAYTON DEVELOPMENTS IN BOSNIA (SINCE DECEMBER 
1995) 
Also called Operation Joint Endeavor, IFOR was "NATO's first ground force 
operation, its first-ever deployment 'out of area,' and its first-ever joint operation with 
NATO's Partnership for Peace partners and other non-NATO countries."72 Indeed, 
eighteen non-NATO nations contributed forces to the 60,000 IFOR troops. There were 
fourteen PfP partners (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine), three 
Mediterranean Dialogue nations (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco), and Malaysia. 
70 Noel Malcol.m, op. cit., p. 267. 
71 Ibid., p. 268. 
72 DavidS. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 195. 
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According to the Peace Agreement signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, !FOR's 
task was to implement the military aspects of the agreement. IFOR was to undertake the 






ensuring the parties' compliance with the cease-fire; 
ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed zones of separation (ZOSs ); 
ensuring the collection of heavy weapons and demobilization of remaining 
forces; 
facilitating the safe withdrawal ofnon-IFOR UN forces; and 
controlling the Bosnian air space. 73 
By successfully fulfilling its military tasks, IFOR played a pivotal role in the 
peace process in Bosnia. By 19 January 1996 the parties to the Peace Agreement had 
withdrawn their forces from the zones of separation, thereby completing the transfer of 
territory among Bosnian entities. By 18 April 1996 all heavy weapons and forces were in 
cantonments or demobilized. After the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections, 
IFOR had successfully completed its mission in Bosnia. 74 Yet the environment was still 
far from secure and much was left to be done on the civilian side. 
Under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Council established under the 
Peace Agreement, a two-year plan regarding the consolidation of peace in Bosnia after the 
expiration of the IFOR mandate was established in Paris and elaborated in London in 
November and December 1996. Based on this plan, NATO Foreign and Defense 
Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence was still necessary for the 
consolidation of the peace process in Bosnia. 75 
Consequently, under UNSCR 1088 of 12 December 1996, operating under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement), an eighteen-month Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) was activated as the legal successor of IFOR on 20 December 1996, the 
day on which !FOR's mandate expired. Besides all NATO nations, twenty-two non-
NATO nations contributed forces to the 31,000 SFOR troops. There were the same 
73 The NATO Handbook (Brussels, Belgium: Office oflnformation and Press, 1998-1999), pp. 120-121. 
74 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
75 Ibid., p. 123. 
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eighteen countries that had contributed to IFOR and four new ones: Argentina, Ireland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. While preserving the same rules of engagement, SFOR's specific 
tasks have addressed the consolidation of the peace process and have thus included: 
• deterring and thereby preventing the resumption of hostilities; 
• consolidating the IFOR's achievements; and 
• selective support to civilian organizations. 76 
Like its IFOR predecessor, SFOR has been a successful military operation. Yet 
mainly because the Peace Agreement's c=vilian provisions remain again far from being 
implemented, the antagonism and conflict in Bosnia were still far from being fully 
extinguished several months before the expiration of SFOR's mandate in June 1998. The 
Dayton settlement had been agreed to by the warring parties only under considerable 
pressure from the United States and therefore it was widely recognized that "Lasting 
peace in Bosnia- and in the rest of the former Yugoslavia- may be feasible only when 
an enduring cessation of hostilities is imposed, obliging the local ethnic groups to live 
and work together."77 Consequently, on the basis of North Atlantic Council decisions in 
December 1997, in February 1998 it was agreed that "SFOR's mandate would be 
extended indefinitely. "78 
Yet at least two major problems seriously challenge the success and even the 
future of the NATO-led SFOR operation. The first is the chronic lack of implementation 
for the most part of the civil, economic, political and judicial provisions of the Peace 
Agreement. Second, as U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen stated before the U.S. 
Congress in 1997, the U.S. commitment in Bosnia cannot be unlimited.79 
Solving the two problems will oblige decision-makers to deal with two major 
dilemmas. The former concerns whether the NATO-led SFOR operation should 
implement the non-military provisions of the Peace Agreement, given that the 
implementation of the military measures alone cannot bring an enduring peace to the 
76 Ibid., p. 124. 
77 DavidS. Yost, op. cit., p. 224. 
78 Ibid., p. 218. 
79 Ibid., p. 218. 
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region and that the very attempt to implement the non-military measures might "endanger 
SFOR's current mandate, to say nothing of its longer-term sustainability."80 The latter 
dilemma concerns whether the Bosnian government alone will be capable of ensuring the 
conditions necessary for the continuation of the peace process initiated in 1995. Official 
U.S. policy holds that the new SFOR mission "is by no means open-ended,"81 while the 
Europeans, committed to an "all in together, all out together"82 policy, will withdraw 
their troops as soon as the Americans withdraw theirs. The West's answers to these 
questions will shape Bosnia's fate. 
80 Ibid., p. 220. 
81 President Clinton quoted in ibid., p. 231. 
82 Fiel Marshall Sir Peter Inge quoted in ibid., p. 218. 
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IV.AFAILURE OF THE WEST 
The horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia raise three questions that 
highlight failures in Western policy since the early 1990s. First, was the war avoidable? 
Second, were the interested external powers (the NATO countries, plus Russia in the 
Contact Group) indeed successful in stopping the killing and preventing partition in 
Bosnia? Third, did the West make effective use of its military capabilities and seize the 
opportunities the situation on the ground offered? 
Initially, for many months before the outbreak of fighting in June 1991, the 
European Community (EC) and the United States tried to prevent the growing crisis from 
erupting into war, but they failed. Then, after the began, the NATO and EC countries 
proved once again unable to take control of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. As 
Noel Malcolm put it in 1995, "The sky has been dark with airplanes shuttling statesmen 
and their entourages between London, Paris, Washington and Geneva. Meetings have 
been held, deferred and reconvened; pieces of papers have been signed, and declarations 
made to the television cameras. And yet, in spite of all of this - or rather, to a large 
extent, because of all this - the killing and destruction in Bosnia have continued 
unabated." 1 Finally, when an opportunity was at hand to give Bosnia an enduring peace 
based on an equilibrium among the local belligerents, the West preferred to impose an 
instant peace and stopped military developments before the local equilibrium could be 
established. 
These three failures add up to what Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch call a 
catastrophic failure.2 Indeed, in the Bosnian case it was initially an anticipatory failure 
that did not look to the future, then a learning failure that had its roots in the past, and 
finally an adaptive failure that mishandled a changing present. When such catastrophic 
failures occur, there may be no escape from absolute disaster. Alternatively, a last minute 
dramatic change in the actors' behavior may avoid disaster by a very narrow margin. The 
failure was not consistent throughout all the security decision-making and executive 
I Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," The National Interest, No. 39 (Spring 1995), 
p.3. . 
2 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The 
Free Press, 1990), pp. 26-27. 
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levels. Therefore, there is no formula for selecting the right levels of authority to examine 
when analyzing failures; this can only be determined on a case by case basis. Levels of 
political decision making and military command may vary in importance depending on 
both their responsibilities and the nature of the conflict in question. 
The analysis below follows Huntington's three-level scheme3 regarding the 
















Figure 1. Three Level Conflict Chart 
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any shortcomings of Huntington's fault line conflict concept but simply uses his concept, 
because it is helpful in understanding the dynamics of the war in Bosnia. The scheme 
displays a three-level interaction with at least six parties and at least seven relations 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Touchstone, 1997), p. 274. 
50 
among them. Horizontal relations across the fault lines exist between pairs of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary parties. Vertical relations exist between the parties on different 
levels on each side.4 
The former Yugoslavia has been a complex and confused site for such a scheme. 
In Huntington's words, ""At the primary level, in Croatia the Croatian government and 
Croats fought the Croatian Serbs, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Bosnian government 
fought the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who also fought each other. At the 
secondary level, the Serbian government promoted a "Greater Serbia' by helping Bosnian 
and Croatian Serbs, and the Croatian government aspired to a "Greater Croatia' and 
supported the Bosnian Croats. At the tertiary level, massive civilizational rallying 
included: Germany, Austria, the Vatican, other European Catholic countries and groups, 
and later, the United States on behalf of Croatia; Russia, Greece, and other Orthodox 
countries and groups behind the Serbs; and Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya, the 
Islamist international, and Islamic countries generally on behalf of the Bosnian 
Muslims."5 
Huntington's scheme is also enlightening to a significant extent when applied to 
the way the war in Bosnia was eventually brought to an end. The halt in the fighting in a 
"'full model" of the Bosnian war respected a scheme that requires: 
• "active involvement of secondary and tertiary parties; 
• negotiation by the tertiary parties of the broad terms for stopping the fighting; 
• use by the tertiary parties of carrots and sticks to get the secondary parties to 
accept these terms and to pressure the primary parties to accept them; 
• withdrawal of support from and, in effect, the betrayal of the primary parties 
by the secondary parties; and 
• as a result of this pressure, acceptance of the terms by the primary parties, 
which, of course, they subvert when they see it in their interest to do so."6 
Such a three-level scheme, apart from Huntington's civilizational fault line war 
concept based on the ""kin country syndrome" approach, is useful in comprehending the 
4 Ibid., p. 294. 
5 Ibid., p. 281. 
6 Ibid., p. 294. 
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complex dynamics of the Bosnian war. Furthermore, the scheme offers the appropriate 
levels required for a complex five-step analysis ofthe Western failures listed above. 
A. A FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE 
1. What Was the Failure? 
The failure in Bosnia was that the West, despite having the necessary power and 
to some extent the will, proved incapable of preventing the war, even though its 
imminence had been obvious for a long time before it began. In the case of Yugoslavia, 
the world has always been aware of the nationalist tensions jeopardizing the unity of the 
country. "Discussion of this issue was not confined to classified government reports; it 
was pursued publicly by both journalists and academic analysts."7 
The West had supported Tito' s firm rule that had kept ethnic tensions under 
control. Tito's death left a Yugoslavia too decentralized for any ethnic group to dominate. 
Therefore it should have been obvious to Western observers that after 1980, nationalist 
pressures would almost certainly destabilize the country and could even lead to 
disintegration and civil war. Unfortunately, Western observers failed to recognize this 
probability. As Noel Malcolm points out, 
Although commentators and analysts had been accurately charting the 
political strategy of the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milosevic 
since 1988 - the take over of the political machinery in Montenegro and 
Vojvodina, the illegal suppression of the local government in Kosovo in 
1989, the mobilization ofnationalist feeling in Serbian public opinion, the 
slow-moving constitutional coup against the federal presidency, the 
Serbian blockade against Croatia and Slovenia in late 1990, the theft by 
Serbia that year of billions of dinars from the federal budget, thereby 
destroying the federal economic reform program, and the incitement and 
arming of Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia during 1990 and 1991 -
7 Saadia Touval, "Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler 
Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International 
Conflict (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 404. 
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it was as if the Western governments could see no pattern in these events 
whatsoever. 8 
Not even in the eleventh hour of the republican elections in December 1990 did 
the West face the facts. Western governments failed again to see what was obvious: the 
elections had been a test of ethnic loyalty. The era of nationalism had begun. Yugoslavia 
was now disintegrating into different power centers, and local regions were developing 
particular nationalist ideologies, each different from the rest. 
2. Critical Failures 
Several failures combined to frustrate Western efforts to prevent the war in 
Bosnia. Chief among these was the West's uninspired hasty push for democratization and 
economic reforms in the conditions specific to Yugoslavia in 1989-1991, its "inability to 
project an image of a clear and unambiguous stance and its lack of leverage. "9 
Western policies promoting economic reforms, respect for human rights, and 
democratization, the standard medicine for curing the world's ills, were applied to 
Yugoslavia as a preventive action. These policies not only failed to bring the expected 
results but also may have contributed to the aggravation of the country's problems in 
1989-1991. The West had conditioned its economic assistance on the reforms the 
Yugoslav government was to undertake. The economic reforms desired were not, 
however, possible as they would have required returning to the central government 
powers the republics had held according to Tito's 1974 constitution. Consequently, the 
changes desired by the West both increased resistance to Belgrade and stimulated further 
the aspirations for independence in Croatia and Slovenia. When its traditional policies 
failed in Yugoslavia, the Western world proved incapable of defining any credible 
alternative policy. Instead of clarity the West's policy signaled ambiguity. 
The ambiguity stemmed from the West's definition of goals in terms of broad 
values whose sometimes contradictory nature led the Yugoslav actors to varying 
interpretations of Western attitudes. The chief difficulty resided in the simultaneous 
8 Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," The National Interest, No. 39 (Spring 1995), 
p.4. 
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advocacy of both unity and democratization. These two objectives were irreconcilable in 
the 1990-1991 Yugoslav context. To preserve unity implied to a certain extent to repress 
nationalist and centrifugal tendencies by violating human rights. For its part, 
democratization invited the formation of nationalist parties and the victory in free 
elections of the leaders advocating independence. As Saadia Touval has observed, "Thus 
attempts to preserve unity were antidemocratic, and the promotion of democracy 
encouraged disintegration. The contradiction inherent in Western goals gave them an air 
of ambiguity, making it difficult for Yugoslav leaders to predict how the West might react 
to their moves."IO 
Furthermore, the West's strategy of conditioning financial assistance and trade 
concessions on the preservation of unity and the pursuit of reforms also lacked credibility. 
The ambiguity and equivocation ofboth the United States and the EUII cast doubt on the 
credibility ofWestern promises and threats. 
Four factors shaped the U.S. response to the growing Yugoslav crisis. The first 
was the change in the country's strategic importance. Yugoslavia no longer affected vital 
American interests after the end of the Cold War. Second, American policy-makers 
doubted whether the United States could effectively influence events in Yugoslavia and 
were reluctant to face the prospect of deploying U.S. military forces for an active 
engagement in the crisis. The third factor was the West European claim that the EC ought 
to take care of the Yugoslav problem. Fourth, the United States could not completely 
detach itself from the growing crisis. As a result, American policy alternated between 
passivity and activism. "When active, it was marked by pontification on fundamental 
values and principles, accompanied by equivocations concerning the immediate issues on 
the agenda."12 However, in essence, American policy complied with the Western rule of 
thumb: it aimed at achieving the goals of preserving unity and advancing reforms; and 
these goals were fundamentally incompatible in the case ofYugoslavia in 1990-1991. 
9 Saadia Touval, op. cit., p. 403. 
10 Ibid., p. 406. 
11 The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in November 1993. 
12 Saadia Touval, op. cit., p. 408. 
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The Europeans were more motivated than the Americans to prevent the war but 
the most influential countries were too divided in their attitudes toward the Yugoslav 
problems to articulate a sound common European policy. The Germans blamed the 
instability and the outbreak of World War I on Serb nationalism and associated the 
establishment of Yugoslavia with the unjust peace settlements imposed on Germany at 
the end of the war in 1918. Similarly, the Italians had not favored the establishment of 
Yugoslavia, and the "territorial conflicts with Yugoslavia after both world wars had 
contributed to an unfavorable image ofthat country in Italian eyes."l3 Britain and France, 
however, had been allied with Serbia in World War I and supported the preservation of 
Yugoslavia. 
These countries all had something in common, however. Each government 
attempted to "use the common [European] institutions to restrain the others from 
pursuing what it regarded as wrong-headed policies."l4 Consequently, in their attempt to 
present a common stance, the Europeans ended up by developing policies that reflected a 
compromise of their initial positions; and this could only result in ambiguity. That was 
clearly reflected in the policy statements regarding the Yugoslav crisis the EC's Council 
of Ministers and the European Commission issued. In short, like the Americans, the West 
Europeans ended up with contradictory goals in their policy toward the Yugoslav crisis. 
Like the Americans, they were simultaneously opposed to centrally enforced unity and to 
secession by unilateral acts. 
Furthermore, "the ambiguity was reinforced by discrepancies between the 
collective European policies emanating from the European institutions and the policies of 
individual states conveyed in bilateral contacts."l5 Because they were aware of the 
divisions among the EC countries, the secessionist Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnians were 
naturally "more inclined to listen to their sympathizers that promised them support than 
to those that threatened them with punishment."l6 
13 Ibid., p. 411. 
14 Ibid., p. 410. 
15 Ibid., p. 411. 
16 Ibid., p. 407. 
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The failure to articulate a clear and credible policy was consistent with the West's 
inability to take military actions aimed at preventing the war. The United States was not a 
major factor in the Yugoslav crisis between July 1991 and March 1992 and let the 
Europeans deal with the growing crisis.17 During the summer of 1991 it was probably 
reasonable to let the EC deal with what the EC itself called a "European problem." When 
by autumn the Serbian plans to take over parts of Croatia had crystallized in attacks on 
Vukovar and Dubrovnik, the situation had certainly changed. "Yet no Western 
government at the time called on NATO's military force to get the JNA to stop shelling 
Dubrovnik, although NATO's supreme commander, General John Galvin, had prepared 
contingency plans for doing so. The use of force was simply too big a step [for NATO] in 
late 1991 ... [If force had been used,] not only would damage to the city have been 
averted, but the Serbs would have been taught a lesson about Western resolve that might 
have deterred at least some of their aggression against Bosnia."18 
Instead, the West then made another mistake. The EC members and the United 
States recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia as independent states but failed to 
provide the appropriate military support. 
3. Layered Analysis 
According to Mark Danner, the U.S. Administration is responsible for the failure 
of U.S. war prevention policy toward Bosnia in 1990-1992. 
It was President George Bush who, during 1990 and 1991, largely ignored 
the ample signs of Yugoslavia's collapse; it was President Bush who after 
the Serbs attacked the Slovenes during July 1991, and despite changes 
enacted only seven months before that had explicitly made such "crisis 
management" part of the alliance's mission, chose to hand off the conflict 
to the Europeans -and to the militarily toothless European Union, not 
NATO; it was Bush who during late summer and fall of 1991 turned aside 
suggestions that American warplanes and ships attack Serb gunners 
shelling Dubrovnik and Vukovar; and Bush who in early 1992 turned aside 
a French suggestion that peacekeepers should be sent to Bosnia to prevent 
war from breaking out. Had President Bush made a different decision in 
17 Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 74 No.2 (March!April1995), p. 15. 
18Jbid., p. 14. 
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any or all of these cases, he might have succeeded in greatly 
circumscribing, or even preventing altogether, the Bosnian war.19 
President Bush was not, however, the only person responsible for U.S. decisions 
regarding the Yugoslav war. The responsibility also resides with his advisers on security 
matters. In 1990-1992, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Adviser for 
National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft maintained a constant position opposed to any 
active U.S. engagement in Yugoslavia. Nor, until after Yugoslavia eventually broke apart, 
did a single member of Congress advocate the use of military force. There was a tacit 
consensus in America's leadership circles not to get the United States involved in the 
Bosnian crisis that Secretary of State James Baker had earlier summarized in a homely 
expression: "We got no dog in this fight."20 
Yet Baker had been one of the very few officials who had advocated the 
introduction of American military power in the Yugoslav equation. Also, during his July 
1991 visit to Yugoslavia, he had left a strong message with Prime Minister Markovic: "If 
you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will always 
choose democracy."21 
James Baker's message was right, but it was "too little, too late." According to 
Warren Zimmermann, "If a mistake was made, it was that the secretary of state had not 
come six months earlier, a time that unfortunately coincided with the massive American 
preparations for the Persian Gulf War."22 Moreover, the visit brought too little 
clarification on the American policies. "The reassertion of American opposition to both 
secession and the enforcement of unity sounded like an equivocation, not a statement of 
policy."23 
America's political leadership also bears responsibility because it took such 
inappropriate decisions regarding the Bosnian crisis in spite of numerous warnings by 
U.S. diplomats, intelligence analysts, scholars, and military experts. The American 
19 Mark Danner, "Slouching Toward Dayton," The New York Review of Books, April23, 1998, pp. 60-61. 
20 Ibid., p. 61. 
21 Warren Zimmermann, op. cit., p.12. 
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Ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, had analyzed scenarios concerning 
potential developments in Yugoslavia. The worst-case scenario that Zimmermann and a 
group of political and economic officers in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade could think of 
in early 1988 was the breakup of the country. They "reported to Washington that no 
breakup of Yugoslavia could happen peacefully."24 But apparently this signal did not 
receive the appropriate attention. 
When Croatia opted for independence in 1991, Zimmermann supported President 
Izetbegovic's request for the deployment of peacekeepers to Bosnia. He cabled to 
Washington to urge that innovative step but had no success. The United States was not 
alone in refusing President Izetbegovic' s request for a deployment of peacekeepers to 
Bosnia. The Bosnian President "asked for, but did not get UN peacekeepers. Vance and 
the UN leadership in New York took the traditional if puzzling line that peacekeepers are 
used after a conflict, not before."25 
The intelligence community was active too. In September 1990 the CIA's lengthy 
"National Intelligence Estimate" flatly declared that "the Yugoslav experiment failed, that 
the country will break up,"26 and that "this is likely to be accompanied by ethnic violence 
and unrest which could lead to civil war."27 While it is likely that few officials disagreed 
with the main thrust of these judgements, the estimate made little impact on the policy-
making community in Washington.28 
For their part the military planners in Washington were also active. They were 
examining possible interventions in Vukovar and Dubrovnik, because the opportunity to 
take successful military action was great. This was obvious in the assessment Colonel 
Karl Lowe, an Army military planner, made: 
First of all, the Yugoslav navy was quite small. In comparison to the 
United States Navy and the power it could bring to the scene in very short 
order, they couldn't contend with that kind of overwhelming power. 
24 Warren Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 6 
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Similarly, the forces of the Serbian army in the vicinity of Vukovar could 
not have withstood air attack by the United States, particularly if those air 
attacks had been very concentrated and very concerted for a number of 
days so you home in on the command and control apparatus.29 
In other words, Colonel Lowe urged a forceful demonstration - a show of force 
-that the United States could have easily performed at that point. That was to "send the 
Navy into the Adriatic, send ground forces from Central Europe down [toward] 
southeastern Europe and redispose air forces to simply fly over the area in a very forceful 
signal that we plan to act if they didn't back off."30 When this creative approach came 
under consideration, Washington ruled it out by refusing to consider even the mildest 
threat of using military force. 
Yet in comparison with United States policy, European policies seemed feckless. 
When the Americans cabled the Europeans in an attempt to convince them to consider the 
Yugoslav crisis at an upcoming CSCE or NATO meeting, the latter's answers were 
"shockingly irresponsible."31 The answers "ranged from expressions of mild interest on 
the part ofthe Austrians and Hungarians, to condescending admonitions not to 'overreact' 
from the English and Germans, to blunt accusations that the Americans were 
'overdramatizing' the situation from the French."32 In short, while the Americans were 
unwilling to take action to address the Yugoslav crisis, the Europeans had yet to admit 
that there was a problem. 
The European leaders also deepened the ambiguity about the European 
Community's policy toward Yugoslavia. On 4 February 1991, the EC foreign ministers 
called on the Yugoslav authorities to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the 
country and to avoid the use of force. The European Parliament, however, raised serious 
doubts about the EC's support for Yugoslavia's unity. Reflecting the political opinions in 
the member states, on 13 March 1991 it adopted a resolution saying "that the constituent 
29 Ibid., p. 63. 
30 Ibid., p. 63. 
31 Ibid., p. 59. 
32 Ibid., p. 59. 
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republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to 
determine their own future."33 
During the 4 April 1991 visit to Belgrade, the Troika representing the presidency 
of the European Council - the foreign ministers, Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, Gianni 
De Michelis ofltaly, and Hans van der Broek of the Netherlands- tried to overcome the 
impression created by the European Parliament's resolution by reaffirming the EC's 
support for the preservation of the country's unity. 
However, in May 1991 the community's attitude changed again. During their visit 
to Belgrade, the President of the European Council, Jacques Santer, and the President of 
the European Commission, Jacques Delors, "no longer listed the preservation of 
Yugoslavia's unity among the conditions for opening negotiations on association, though 
those conditions could be seen as implicit in a longer and more detailed list of 
conditions. "34 
Only two days before Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence did the 
EC make its intentions clear. On 23 June 1991 the EC foreign ministers agreed "not to 
acknowledge" unilateral declarations of independence and reaffirmed their refusal of "any 
contact" with secessionists. Yet the chairman of the European Council added that "the 
Twelve do not state they will never recognize a Yugoslav Republic wanting to leave the 
federation but this decision [to secede] 'must be the result of negotiation and internal 
agreement. "'35 
The ambiguous image of the EC's policy was reinforced by the contradictory 
signals individual EC members sent. In February 1991, Chancellor Kohl expressed 
concern about the Yugoslav crisis but he did not say anything about the need to preserve 
the country's unity.36 The chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Norbert 
Gansell, even suggested that the EC change its policy toward support for Croatian and 
Slovenian independence. The Croats must also have felt encouraged in the pursuit of their 
independence by the warm welcome President Tudjman received from the Italian 
33 Saadia Touval, op. cit., p. 412. 
34 Ibid., p. 412. 
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president and prime minister, as well as from the Pope during his May 1991 visit in Italy. 
The strongest opposition to Croatian independence came from French Prime Minister 
Edith Cresson. In her welcoming speech to Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic on 23 
May 1991 Cresson clearly stated that "Yugoslavia cannot be part of Europe unless she 
remains united."37 
In view of these hesitant and ambiguous signals, Milosevic could see by 1990 that 
he was free to ignore America as well as Europe, since no concrete threats, much less 
action, had accompanied their policy statements so far. When the unity of Yugoslavia was 
endangered in the late 1980s by Slovenia's secessionist tendencies, he pretended to be the 
apostle of unity, to preserve a unity that Serbia could dominate. By 1991, when he 
realized that the Slovene and Croat independence movements as well as his own 
disruptive actions in the name of unity had dealt a lethal blow to the preservation of 
Yugoslavia, Milosevic made a new strategic choice: "rather than try, at all costs to 
preserve the state, as the Yugoslav army wished to do, he would carve a greater Serbia 
out of it. The rest followed logically: Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Zvornik, Sarajevo."38 
B. A FAILURE TO LEARN 
1. What Was the Failure? 
After having failed to prevent the obviously imminent war, it took months until 
some of the Western powers could first intervene in Bosnia. When the West eventually 
took action, it did so in a way that revealed a deep misunderstanding of Bosnia's 
problems. Indeed, "At no point during the Bosnian war have the pronouncements of 
Western statesmen shown any clear understanding of who made this war happen and 
why."39 The West's chief failure so far has been a failure to learn from Bosnia's history. 
It is a failure to understand that Bosnia has been a distinctive entity where three ethnically 
identical groups differentiate themselves on the grounds of religious allegiances. It was 
3? Ibid., p. 413. 
38 Roger Cohen, "Peace in His Time," The New Republic, March 11, 1996, p. 39. 
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also a failure to understand that the violence has been largely generated by external 
factors. 
The West had preferred to build its understanding of the Bosnian war on the 
grounds of"ancient ethnic hatreds." Two theories, one external, and one internal, tried to 
explain the historical inevitability of the war in Bosnia. The former holds that the break 
up of Yugoslavia was caused by the collapse of communism. 
Only Communism, one was told - this view quickly found favor among 
United Nations officials in the former Yugoslavia, who, as 'peacekeepers' 
bound to dealing with all groups impartially, naturally were drawn to this 
'plague on all their houses' stance- had kept the nationalist demons at 
bay. Once the system had collapsed, the revival of ethnic antagonism had 
been inevitable, even if a more inspired international diplomatic effort or 
better leaders within the former Yugoslav republics might have mitigated 
the catastrophic form these clashes had taken.40 
The latter theory also gives comfort by using a limited number of historical 
examples ofwars and massacres whose superficial analysis supports the same conclusion: 
the inevitability of the Bosnian war. In fact, some historians have concluded that "in the 
past Bosnia was not a particularly violent place - at least by the violent standards of 
European history. The twentieth century was something of a tragic exception, but no 
more in Bosnia than in Poland, and people do not harbor similarly extreme fantasies 
about the Polish national character."41 But in selecting examples from Bosnian history, 
the West went back only as far as the twentieth century or at most the late nineteenth 
century. In this way the Westerners failed to grasp the fact that such examples "arose 
mainly from the most untypical episodes in Balkan history, conflicts introduced or 
exacerbated by forces (such as the Axis invasion) from outside Yugoslavia itself. For 
most of the rest of the history of those lands, there are no records of Croats killing Serbs 
because they were Serbs, or vice versa. "42 
40 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 74. 
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The quasi-general Western acceptance of the two theories resulted in a distorted 
view that determined a two-track failure so far as the appropriate steps the West should 
undertake in the Bosnian crisis were concerned. First, such a view made understanding 
the nature of the Bosnian war impossible. 
In the eyes of Western policymakers, this war was not a project engaged in 
by a set of people with political aims; it was an outbreak of an 
undifferentiated thing called "violence," which had just sprung up as a 
symptom of Bosnia's general malaise, here, there everywhere. Clausewitz 
was out; Freud and Jung, as theorists of death wish and the collective 
unconscious, were perhaps thought more appropriate. Lacking a political 
understanding ofthe origins and the nature of the war, the West responded 
to it not with politics but with therapy.43 
It was now clear that the West could no longer objectively see an appropriate way 
to stop the war. Consequently, politicians looked exclusively at the symptoms and thus 
managed to ignore the causes. 
Second, such a view made partition along ethnic lines a desirable solution. The 
reasoning was simple: "If violence is the natural product of hatred, and hatred the natural 
mode of interaction between people who were ethnically different, then the obvious way 
to stop the violence is to separate the ethnic groups.';44 
In retrospect it appears that only by removing any trace of rationality and political 
understanding from its analysis ofthe view on the Bosnian war could the West take such 
absurd action. "And yet that excision was performed, and performed thoroughly."45 
2. Critical Failures 
Although its policy was based on an acceptance, through ignorance, of the 
assumption that the war was inevitable, the West comforted itself with the "ancient ethnic 
hatreds" approach. Four principles were evident in the thinking of politicians in the 
United States and West European countries when they elaborated that policy. The 
European governments (led by France and Britain) and the United States government 
43 Ibid., p. 6. 
44 Ibid., p. 8. 
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sought to uphold principles they believed would be consistent with their interests in the 
long run; but the actions they took eventually failed to support these interests. 
The first principle was the need for "stability." According to Noel Malcolm, this 
was "one of the key words in the British Foreign Office lexicon, where it tends to be 
associated with the doctrine that every region needs one strong local power to keep it in 
order."46 Although it was never said that Serbia ought to be that dominant power in the 
Balkans, this principle was nevertheless obvious in the eagerness of the West European 
governments, especially London, to accept the Serb conquest in Bosnia as a fait accompli. 
The second principle stemmed from the desire to avoid setting precedents for 
other parts of the ex-communist world. This desire had been the chief force behind the 
West's determination to preserve Yugoslavia's unity in June 1991. It had been inspired by 
the fear of a sudden breakup of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union broke up anyway. 
"Since that moment, the argument about precedent setting has ceased to be a justification 
for Western policy and has become a condemnation ofit."47 
Third, especially in France and Britain, the predominant importance attached to 
maintaining good relations with the current regime in Russia influenced the handling of 
the Bosnian crisis. Valuing the "new era of East-West cooperation" that had begun in 
1990-1991, the Western powers were reluctant to do anything that would have challenged 
good relations with Russia and thus neglected the Bosnians. "Since the Russians tended 
to support the Serbs, the inevitable effect of subordinating our Bosnian policy to the 
desire not to offend Russia was to make that policy more p~o-Serb."48 Furthermore, the 
idea that Russia is the natural ally of Serbia has a shaky historical foundation. The 
traditional Russian bridgehead in the Balkans has been Bulgaria rather than Serbia, as 
shown by the 1877 war. After the Second World War relations between Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union were cold for nearly fifty years.49 
The fourth factor was the role the United States had to play in advancing the 
Bosnian Muslims' interests against the European "concern that the establishment of a 
461bid., p. 10. 
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Muslim state in the former Yugoslavia would create a base for the spread of Muslim 
immigrants and Islamic fundamentalism."50 The fact that important Islamic allies of the 
United States such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were watching closely for any sign 
of potential American abandonment of the Muslim-led Bosnian government reinforced 
the U.S. inclination to back Alja Izetbegovic more resolutely than any West European 
country. Therefore, despite its being what Huntington calls "a noncivilizational anomaly 
in the otherwise universal pattern of kin backing kin,"5 1 the American decision appears to 
have been pragmatic. It may have limited the involvement of Islamic countries in the 
Bosnian war. 
The Westerners failed to apply the first three principles correctly and thus failed to 
achieve their goals. In short, lacking objectives other than vague guiding principles, the 
West failed to define an appropriate policy toward the Bosnian crisis. This was obvious in 
three consecutive steps taken by Western governments. 
First, for years, the West failed to distinguish clearly the primary warring parties 
m the Bosnian conflict. Instead, both Europe and America relied on "doctrine of 
equivalence." The "ancient ethnic hatreds" thesis conveniently rendered all parties to the 
war equivalent. Attackers and defenders were assigned the same status. Since the 
Muslims' hatred could be no more justified than the Serbs' or the Croats' hatred, the 
West conducted its activities "on the principle that everyone was more or less equally 
guilty. "52 
Furthermore, until March 1994 the West failed to group on the same side the two 
warring parties that regarded the Serbs as a common enemy. The Croat-Muslim split had 
given the Serbs an opportunity to carve up Bosnia by political means backed with the 
threat of armed force. The Bosnian Croats not only openly fought the Muslims but they 
also responded to and, to some extent, imitated the Serb initiatives. After the Bosnian 
Serbs had set up their "Autonomous Regions" in May 1991 and a "parliament" in October 
1991, the Croat counterpart proclaimed its "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna" in 
50 Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 271. 
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July 1992. When the SDS (Bosnian Serbs' Party) issued a map proposing the national 
"cantonization" of Bosnia (with roughly 70 per cent of the territory as Serb cantons) in 
December 1991, the HDZ (Bosnian Croats' Party) replied not long afterwards with a map 
of its own (with roughly 30 per cent of the territory as Croat cantons).53 Indeed, 
Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman met twice, in March 1991 and February 1992, to 
discuss the partition of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. This Serb-Croat conspiracy 
came to an abrupt end in March 1994, when, under significant American and German 
pressure, the Croats and the Muslims signed the agreement to create the Muslim-Croat 
Federation. 
Second, for years, the West failed to stop its unintended but crucial support to the 
Serbs' cause in Bosnia by maintaining in place an ill-conceived arms embargo. On 25 
September 1991, when Bosnia was still part of the Yugoslav federation, UNSCR 713 
introduced an arms embargo against the whole of Yugoslavia. In April 1992, however, 
Bosnia received formal recognition as an independent state, and in May 1992 it was 
admitted as a full member to the UN. Yet the embargo remained in place, violating 
Bosnia's legitimate right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It was 
certainly applied to Serbia too, but Serbia and its forces in Bosnia had "the stockpiles of 
the fourth largest army in Europe."54 Consequently, far from "reducing the quantity of 
fighting," the embargo "intervened decisively, entrenching the massive military 
superiority of the force which launched the original attack on Bosnia in April 1992. "55 
The Europeans and the Americans held different opinions on this matter. The 
Americans had been rhetorically committed to the idea that the Bosnian government 
should be given a chance to fight back; and in late 1994, they decided that they would no 
longer enforce the embargo. For their part, "the Europeans denied that any aggression had 
even taken place, and spoke instead of a civil war in Bosnia," and steadfastly opposed 
lifting the arms embargo. 56 
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Third, the West failed to oppose the de facto partition of Bosnia. Indeed, the West 
constantly guided its policy according to what it called "the facts on the ground,"57 a 
phrase employed to describe the conditions which the outside world was powerless or 
unwilling to alter. This attitude was apparent in the evolution of the peace plans the 
interested external powers elaborated. The Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg and "Contact 
Group" plans mirrored the percentages of Bosnian territory each of the three warring 
parties had acquired by military means. The plans explicitly reflected and endorsed the 
"front lines" of the Serb military conquests. 
Furthermore, the relationship between Western policies and military analyses was 
definitely ambiguous. "It is hard, for example, to think of a single speech by any British, 
American, or European politician which has discussed Serbian war aims at any length, or 
even used the term 'war aims' at all. "58 This critical failure helps to explain the poor 
coordination of the Europeans and the Americans with respect to the UN and NATO 
interventions in the Bosnian war. NATO was more inclined to follow the generals and 
admirals that "ached to be cut loose and allowed to inflict damage on the enemy. But the 
UN . . . insisted that almost all potential bombing was a political act that had to be 
approved by the civilian in charge of the U.N. operation."59 Additionally, to "complicate 
matters, both the NATO council and the Security Council were divided between the pro-
bombers led by the United States and the anti-bombers led by Britain and France. "60 The 
lack of agreement resulted in ambiguity and little efficiency in the West's use of the 
strong military muscle it had at its disposal. Until August 1995 the UN successfully 
prevented NATO from doing what it was prepared to do: to fight. As a consequence of 
the perpetual mutual blocking, the UN and NATO failed to perform three critical tasks. 
First, NATO and the UN failed to enforce the "no-fly zone" the Security Council 
had imposed in October 1992. A UNSCR in May J 993 authorized NATO to shoot down 
any plane or helicopter flying over Bosnia without UN clearance, but NATO airplanes 
could not fire upon the offending aircraft without prior UN approval. NATO jets flew 
57 Ibid., p. 8. 
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over Bosnia every day; but with one exception, when four Serb jets were shot down, they 
did little else. By late March 1995, the UN had reported 4,217 violations by Serb, 
Muslim, and Croat helicopters and planes in the two and a half years since the imposition 
of the no-fly zone.61 Most of the violations involved non-combat airplanes and 
helicopters carrying soldiers and civilians within Bosnia, and the UN insisted that it 
would be wrong to shoot down most of these aircraft. 
Second, the UN failed to make the "safe areas" safe. The "safe areas" resolution 
generated many of the outcomes feared most by UN workers in the field. The "safe areas" 
became some of the unsafe places in Bosnia, prey to disease and dependent on UN food 
aid and on Serb and Croat tolerance for such food deliveries. "Moreover, by mid-October, 
even the limited objective of protecting the 'safe areas' had overstreatched the existing 
UNPROFOR forces, while attacks on UN aid convoys were becoming increasingly 
frequent. "62 Perhaps these "safe areas" had helped to prevent a massacre in 1993, but they 
increasingly became zones of conflict. 
For the UN troops, the "safe areas" functioned as reservations where Serbs could 
easily seize Western hostages. This situation made Western governments reluctant to 
adopt any policies that might invite the Serbs to retaliate against vulnerable Western 
troops. "Western leaders, in christening these enclaves 'safe,' had failed to muster the will 
or the resources to defend them. Designating the 'safe areas' two years before had been a 
political, not a military act. "63 The politicians had done this to gratify people in the West, 
particularly the Americans, who applauded what deceptively appeared to be an expression 
of strong will. The politicians had taken little time, however, to assess whether the "safe 
areas" were militarily defensible. 
Third, the UN and NATO failed to use the airpower they had at hand effectively. 
The basic principles of how the air strikes would be delivered were fundamentally ill-
conceived. The airpower could not be used for the defense of the "safe areas" unless the 
60 Ibid., p. 325. 
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UN personnel within the "safe areas" came under attack. Then, according to the 
cumbersome "dual key" principle, both the UN and NATO leaders had the power to block 
any proposed air attack. Consequently, when used on a few occasions and then only for 
timid "pinprick" attacks, the air strikes did little more than "to drop a bomb or two on 
some isolated mortar or tank."64 
However, the Serbs once again found a way to counter Western actions. They 
simply took hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage. Since the UN peacekeepers were 
spread throughout Bosnia, often in small groups as observers or humanitarian convoy 
escorts, it was not difficult to capture and detain them. The Serb "hostage-taking" strategy 
worked well: the air strikes stopped. According to Stanley Meisler, "neither UN officials 
nor the governments supplying troops wanted to goad the Serbs into killing their 
hostages. NATO had finally brought airpower to the war in Bosnia, but the Serbs had 
brushed it aside. "65 The West eventually took the appropriate action, but not until August 
1995. 
Furthermore, there was nothing in the Western strategy capable of stopping the 
Serbian "ethnic cleansing" strategy. At local level, Serbs went "first to terrify the local 
Muslims into flight, and secondly to radicalize the local Serb population, recruiting some 
of its young men into this glamorous new occupation, in order to establish Serbian 
control"66 on the ground. For these two purposes a good number of random killings in 
cold blood was enough. But the psychology of terror introduced by the Serb paramilitary 
was not enough. "An equally important part of the psychological operation was to 
convince the local Serbs that they had to 'defend' themselves against their Muslim 
neighbors. The ground had been prepared, of course, by the broadcast of Radio Television 
Belgrade, warning Serbs of Ustasa pogroms and fundamentalist jihads. "67 No one in the 
UN, NATO, or any other Western organization could imagine how to stop that. 
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Yet the ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbs eventually proved to be an unwise 
strategic choice. According to Mark Danner, "instead of crushing the thoroughly 
unprepared and defenseless Bosnian government, as the world's leaders had clearly 
expected they would, the Serbs, in order to secure their ideological goal of ethnic 
cleansing, had left aside their two prime strategic tasks: conquering the enclaves -
several of which, including Srebrenica, stood near Serbia's border and thus had to be 
taken in order to secure 'Greater Serbia' -and forcing the Bosnian leaders to sue for 
peace. "68 The ethnic cleansing produced a fatal delay and forced the reluctant Western 
leaders to respond. By the time they met on Mount J ahorina in the spring of 1995 the 
Serb politicians and officers must have been able to see the flaws in their strategy. 
Triumphant in victory three years earlier, the Serbs had assumed that it would only be a 
matter of time before they would get around to dealing with the enclaves and eliminating 
the Bosnian embryonic state. But they had been wrong. 
3. Layered Analysis 
The contradictory positions among the great European powers alone would have 
perhaps been enough to doom Bosnia. The British were in favor of partition. The French 
were actively pro-Serb, at least until President Fran9ois Mitterrand left office in May 
1995. The Germans had endorsed the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, but then 
made a grave mistake by promptly withdrawing from any serious diplomatic, let alone 
military, involvement. 
The Europeans earned harsh criticisms. As David Rieff has noted, "In the early 
stages of the Yugoslav collapse, Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, 
speaking in the name ofthe European Union, boasted that it was 'the hour of Europe.' He 
insisted that the Americans were not needed. And the Bush administration ... seized on 
the opportunity that Europeans had so thoughtfully provided. "69 When they eventually 
intervened, the Europeans did so on the basis of an erroneous understanding of the war 
and what should be done about it. As a matter of principle, Mark Danner has observed, 
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"limited interventions may help end a war if the intervenor takes sides and tilts the 
balance in a way that allows one side to win. Impartial intervention may end a war if the 
outside power takes complete control of the situation and imposes a peace settlement that 
all respect. The first type of intervention is limited but not impartial, the second is 
impartial but not limited. The Europeans tried to carry out both a limited and an impartial 
intervention, and it didn't work. "70 
For the first eighteen months of the Yugoslav war, President Bush and his 
advisors had maintained a disciplined standoff-ishness, which they stubbornly held even 
during the uproar following televised pictures of concentration camps. The Bush 
administration imparted no false hopes to the embattled Bosnians. The Clinton 
administration nourished such false hopes, however, in both foreign and domestic forums. 
In his electoral campaign the then-governor of Arkansas proclaimed that his 
administration would act to end the killing and that America would not be a party to 
agreements that rewarded ethnic cleansing and Serb military gains. These words proved 
politically potent, but "the fact was that when it came to Bosnia Clinton had no policy. "71 
For years, "however sincerely [Anthony] Lake and many other members of the campaign, 
notably AI Gore and Madeleine Albright, agreed with the sentiments these words 
expressed,"72 the Clinton administration's actions would betray its statements regarding 
Bosnia. 
In 1993 and 1994, American policy toward Bosnia amounted to little more than 
criticizing the conduct of the UN peacekeeping effort and stymieing the various peace-
plans that Vance and Owen, and later the Norwegian politician Stoltenberg were 
proposing. Two factors finally provoked the Clinton administration to get involved in 
Bosnia- domestic politics and the threat to NATO's survival. With a presidential election 
at hand, Clinton was about to lose control of foreign policy on a fundamental issue. The 
Senate threatened to take Bosnia policy away from the White House by voting for Robert 
Dole's bill to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The administration knew it now had to 
regain the initiative. 
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But the reason for the intervention may also be tracked to "the sudden, last-minute 
discovery ofa technicality in the American military commitment to NAT0."73 To the 
amazement of President Clinton, who believed he had publicly vowed to support with 
American troops a withdrawal of the 25,000 UN peacekeepers from Bosnia, the United 
States was committed to this action because of something called OpPlan 40-104 - "a 
highly classified document of 1,500 pages that covered, Holbrooke writes, 'every aspect 
of NATO's role in supporting a UN withdrawal, from bridge building to body bags."'74 
Clinton had never approved such a NATO plan or been briefed on it. Yet the plan had 
been formally approved under NATO procedures by being approved by the North 
Atlantic Council in Brussels, which includes representatives from all the alliance 
countries including the United States. It had thus turned out that the withdrawal of the 
British and French troops from Bosnia would in any case involve American troops, 
whether Clinton or the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored such action or not. 
Additionally, the reasons for the American military participation m the 
intervention in Bosnia might be related to the changes in French policy. France's 
determination to withdraw its troops from Bosnia was much stronger by May 1995, when 
President Chirac demanded that the West either strengthen its effort to punish the 
Bosnian Serbs or withdraw. In effect, Chirac presented the Clinton administration with an 
ultimatum. As Holbrooke comments, Chirac "put the Administration in a tight bind, but 
one that was important in forcing us to start dealing with the reality - that one way or 
another, the United States could no longer stay uninvolved."75 The Clinton administration 
would eventually do the right thing, but its intervention in Bosnia came too late. "The 
United States did not prevent a genocide, it prevented the completion of a genocide. "76 
Yet neither the Americans nor the Europeans were alone in their culpability. The 
UN personnel as well as the EC negotiators have their fair share too. For most of the 
time, they showed no understanding of the war in Bosnia, and they perceived the 
negotiations as fruitless and frustrating. 
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Peter Carrington, the first EC negotiator, declared "that he had never encountered 
such terrible liars in his life as the people of the Balkans. "77 Boutros Boutros-Ghali "was 
quick to admonish the people of the city [Sarajevo] to stop complaining so much: there 
were ten places he could name whose citizens were worse off than they were. "78 Owen 
had been on the bellicose side "until he became involved, at which point he began 
denouncing virtually anyone who called for the use of force against the Serbs as a 'lap-top 
bombardier.' Vance was not pro-Serb . . . but he was certainly a plague-on-all-their-
houses man from the beginning of his tenure at the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia. Stoltenberg revealed his views in an infamous speech before the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg, in which he declared that the Bosnian Muslims were 
in reality Serbs! And it was an article of faith among the UN officials ... that Muslims 
were just as bad as their enemies. If they had committed fewer crimes, UN officials 
constantly insinuated, it was because they had the least means. 79 
Consequently, the UN officials tried to stay impartial. But in Bosnia to be 
impartial did not mean to be fair. Moreover, sometimes such impartiality could "be 
positively grotesque, as when Yasushi Akashi, the Secretary General's Special Envoy, left 
a meeting in Pale and declared to the press that he believed Radovan Karadzic to be 'a 
man of peace,' boasting of the 'friendship' that had developed between them. "80 The 
complicity between such negotiators and the Serbs appears obvious in retrospect. It is 
therefore not surprising that the peace-plans they advanced endorsed the Serb military 
conquests. 
Furthermore, the UN officials actively blocked military actions that NATO was 
ready to undertake to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions regarding the "no-fly 
zone," the protection of the "safe areas," and the use of air strikes when the Serbs defied 
the UN resolutions. The most notable UN official in this category was perhaps Akashi, 
who compiled a long record ofblocking NATO air strikes. He allowed the Serbs to slide 
76 Ibid., p. 33. 
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over the deadline of an ultimatum that required the withdrawal of the heavy artillery 
pieces from the area around Sarajevo. Then for over four hours he delayed the approval 
for an air strike in support of a French battalion in Bihac trying to halt a Serb tank and 
Serb artillery pieces aiming at them. When the approval finally arrived, it was too late to 
find the Serb weapons for the simple reason that the Serbs had withdrawn them. The air 
strike was canceled since the NATO raid had been approved against the offending 
weapons and no others. NATO could not bomb the Serb artillery pieces defying another 
UN ultimatum around the enclave of Goradze in April 1994 because Akashi vetoed the 
proposal. 
Akashi's legendary patience definitely grated on the nerves of both those who felt 
he "made NATO look like a toothless tiger"81 and those who had seen far too much of 
the way Karadzic waged war. Akashi's decreasing popularity was perhaps best captured 
by the nicknames the UN field officers and journalists came up with for him: "the 
Mitsubishi Cetnik" and "the· Senior Serb Liaison Officer."82 Also, for many who had 
come to know and distrust Akashi, he "was a two-faced apologist for the Serbs, trying 
with his words to forestall a firmer stand on the part of the NATO powers. "83 But in fact 
he was simply "a man of the UN" engaged in Bosnian affairs only in a narrowly 
constrained professional way. "Akashi wasn't even pro-Serb."84 
The use, or rather the misuse, of military forces mirrored the ambiguity and lack 
of clear political goals of Western diplomacy. Consequently, many senior officers, 
including the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Sir Michael 
Rose, "whose mantra about not crossing 'the Mogadishu line'85 separating neutral 
peacekeeping from involvement in a war will be remembered as one of the more fatuous 
refrains of the Balkan tragedy,"86 seemed to share the politicians' confusion and 
miscomprehension of the Bosnian war. General Rose was a good match for the policy 
81 Stanley Meisler, op. cit., pp. 325-326. 
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Akashi and Owen adopted without understanding that neutrality in the Bosnian war 
signified the appeasement of the Serbs. Yet, besides being limited by the UN mandate, 
there was little someone like General Rose could have done to overcome the general 
opposition to seeking a military solution that was quasi-generally shared until mid-August 
1995. 
Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, who succeeded General Rose, eventually 
crossed the Mogadishu line in 1995; but success did not come easily. It could not be 
achieved until the politicians changed their attitude about how the Bosnian war was to be 
ended. Committed to making the full use of the scope for action the UN resolutions gave 
the military in Bosnia, Smith elaborated a two-phase strategy and presented it to all the 
UN dignitaries or allied officials that passed through Sarajevo. 
According to General Smith's "thesis," the international community must allow 
him to "bomb targets other than 'smoking guns' and 'escalate to success,' or, if they were 
not prepared to do so, 'the machine would break.' In the latter case, air power would lose 
its deterrent effect on the Serbs and, if the international community wanted UNPROFOR 
to continue to function, it would be forced to create another, better machine with a 
broader range of capabilities and more secure bases for the UN troops in Bosnia. "87 
The "escalating to success" phase required the UN to authorize NATO to launch 
air strikes and to respond with even more air strikes after the Serbs had again seized UN 
hostages or make the UN personnel less vulnerable by greatly reducing their presence in 
places such as the "safe areas." Further hostage-taking or a ~ithdrawal in fear of hostage-
taking would have demonstrated that the machinery to deal with the Bosnian war the 
external powers had organized and operated was "broken." It was then the right time for 
General Smith and his superior, General Janvier, to propose another approach to the 
Western leaders another indisputably workable machine. 
General Smith began to "escalate to success" on 25 May 1995 when he sent 
NATO airplanes to attack Serb positions. Simultaneously General Janvier presented the 
UN Security Council in New York the formal alternative of the "escalating to success 
86 Roger Cohen, op. cit., p. 36. 
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strategy," called "measures to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness and security." If 
accepted, this proposal would have allowed the UN to withdraw its personnel from the 
"safe areas" and leave just the number of military observers necessary to call for air 
strikes when the "safe areas" were violated. This strategy could "counteract the main 
political weakness affecting the resolve of governments to use force: the vulnerability of 
UNPROFOR to hostage taking by the Bosnian Serbs. "88 
But the proposed strategy was angrily rejected. The American ambassador, 
Madeleine Albright, declared it "flatly and completely wrong."89 In doing so she simply 
exposed the deep contradiction of the U.S. policy that could not give up the "safe areas" 
fiction: "if their creation had been politically inspired, they had now become a symbol 
that could be made real only through an act of political courage. "90 The fiction blindly 
refused to acknowledge that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops had become the only 
politically workable way to make an "effective and robust action" possible. Consequently, 
on 29 May 1995, "General Smith received his answer from Janvier, in the form of 
directive 2/95: The execution of the mandate is secondary to the security of UN 
personnel. "91 
The Mogadishu line was eventually crossed in September-October 1995, but only 
after President Clinton had been forced to take action and the European leaders had 
significantly changed their approach toward intervention in Bosnia. "The cumbersome 
UN-NATO 'dual key' system of decision-making had been streamlined, giving more 
direct authority to NATO commanders; the [European] Reaction Force had deployed its 
artillery on Mount Igman, outside Sarajevo; and the last group of British soldiers had just 
been withdrawn from Goradze, thus depriving the Serbs of their easiest source of 
potential hostages. "92 General Smith's strategy had in this way been eventually applied. 
NATO pilots could now destroy Serb antiaircraft batteries, radar sites, ammunition 
depots, command bunkers, and bridges without fear of any hostage-taking. 
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The Croats and the Bosnian Muslims also benefited from the Western use of 
General Smith's strategy. "Indeed, NATO planes had in effect become the Croatian and 
Bosnian air force, ensuring that they would succeed,"93 when they combined their attacks 
in northwest Bosnia and thus changed the balance of power. By the end of September 
1995, the Serbs held only as much territory as had been envisaged in the Contact Group. 
The Bosnian Serbs had changed their flawed "ethnic cleansing" strategy in 1995. 
With events running against them, they returned to their original war aims. "The first goal 
was to create hardship in Sarajevo in a bid to convince Muslim leaders that further 
resistance was futile; the second was to overrun the Srebrenica, Zepa, Goradze and Bihac 
safe areas in order to make possible the eventual merger the Serb land in Bosnia with 
Serbia. "94 If the Bosnian Serbs had done that one year earlier, they might have been 
successful, but by the summer of 1995 it was too late, politically and militarily. 
By mid-1995 the Western leaders had changed their approach toward Bosnia, and 
Milosevic had also understood that the Bosnian Serbs could not win the war. By 1995 he 
was eager to end the war, but the Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale in their arrogance 
presumed to ignore his directives. The Bosnian Serbs had already done so in May 1994 
when Radovan Karadzic rejected the first "Contact Group" peace plan, even though 
Milosevic had found satisfactory the 51/49 Fedeni.tion/Serb ratio in the division of the 
Bosnian territory. American diplomacy had pushed the Bosnian Muslims and Croats into 
a Federation. Iranian weapons flowed to the Bosnians through Zagreb. Retired American 
generals advised the much-strengthened Croatian army, which was obvious in this army's 
operations in September-October 1995. These developments sufficed to make Milosevic 
understand that "whatever his pretensions to have fathered 'Greater Serbia' he would not 
risk his power by moving to rescue his erstwhile proteges in Pale. "95 
Milosevic's decision to achieve peace in Bosnia by cooperating with the West and 
betraying the Bosnian Serbs was apparent in four decisions. First, to signal displeasure 
with Karadzic's rejection ofthe "Contact Group" peace plan in May 1994, he limited the 
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supplies of weapons and fuel that once flowed freely across the Drina. Consequently, 
each day the Bosnian Serbs grew weaker and their Croat and Muslim enemies stronger. 
Second, Milosevic sat on his hands while the Croats seized Slavonia in May 1995 
and the entire Krajina region in August 1995. In both cases the Serb population in the 
conquered areas retreated to Bosnia, apparently following the instructions of their own 
local political leaders. 
Third, Milosevic sat on his hands once again when the Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats reduced the Serb-conquered territory in Bosnia from 70 to roughly 49 per cent in 
mid-September 1995. 
Fourth, Milosevic imposed peace on the Bosnian Serbs. At Dayton, he ignored the 
Bosnian Serb members of his delegation. "For the Americans they were invisible; for 
Milosevic, they were to know only what he chose to tell them about what he had 
negotiated on their behalf. Indeed, only minutes before the signing ceremony, Milosevic 
told the Bosnian Serbs that he had given up the Serb demand for Sarajevo. "96 
The United States dealt with Milosevic and thus by-passed the Bosnian Serbs at 
Dayton. Perhaps this was the most pragmatic way to reach an earlier end to the war. The 
Americans were now in effect abandoning the liberal ideals announced by Clinton during 
the 1992 electoral campaign. Therefore, Dayton could not represent anything more than 
an accord brilliantly negotiated at the expense of justice. 
C. AFAILURETOADAPT 
1. What Was the Failure? 
According to Charles Boyd, "It is often stated, incorrectly, that the Dayton Accord 
stopped the fighting in Bosnia. What it did, with the aid of 60,000 U.S. and coalition 
troops, was to freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire and to prevent a resumption of 
hostilities. "97 The West - led by the United States - simply twisted the arms of the 
96 Warren Bass, "The Triage of Dayton," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77 No.5 (September/October 1998), p. 
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waning parties, with little regard for the concerns of the Bosnian Serbs, and concluded a 
peace that vindicated no one. In achieving the Dayton Accord, the interested external 
parties had chosen to support an imposed peace instead of pursuing justice, which would 
have been more costly. The West thus failed to bring Bosnia an enduring peace. 
In practical terms, the United States had stood before two roads. One of those 
roads, the road around Banja Luka, would maintain the Republika Srpska. This was the 
solution that had been agreed by the "Contact Group" - the United States, Britain, 
France, Germany, and Russia. This road could well bring peace but too little justice. The 
other solution was "the conquest of Banja Luka and with it the destruction of Republika 
Srpska - the destruction of General Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, and other sinister 
ideologists of ethnic cleansing - and the destruction of some sort of integral Bosnia. 
Shattered as it was by NATO bombs, ignored by its godfather, Slobodan Milosevic of 
Yugoslavia, the Serb Republic of Bosnia could not survive the loss of its largest city. "98 
The latter solution would have brought Bosnia much more vindication but it would have 
also cost more and placed a heavier burden of responsibility on America in its attempt to 
build the new Bosnian state. The United States chose the former road. 
Consequently, the fulfillment of several crucial conditions for an enduring peace 
was postponed indefinitely. While the military aspects of the Dayton Accord have so far 
been successfully implemented, partly because the IFOR and SFOR efforts have been 
robust and partly because the separation mission reflects the desires of the antagonists 
themselves, the civilian tasks are still on "stand-by mode." 
Moreover, the political and legal aspects of the Dayton Accord strongly pointed 
toward de facto partition, which might eventually lead to the secession of the Republika 
Srpska and war if the Federation contested the secession. The UN, NATO, other 
European organizations, and the United States in particular failed to secure success when, 
in September-October 1995, it seemed to many observers to be there for the taking. But 
the West intervened to protect the Bosnian Serbs from military defeat when this was 
imminent. 
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2. Critical Failures 
When such an opportunity arose in 1995, the West chose to deal with Milosevic 
instead of defeating him and his proteges in Pale. The West failed to do what might have 
been reasonably expected of it. As Noel Malcolm pointed out, "It was a strange outcome 
to a conflict which had come so close, with the rapid collapse of Serb forces in north-
western Bosnia in September and October 1995, to being resolved by straightforward 
military means."99 
After the Croatian and Bosnian government forces' successful Operation Storm 
had made dramatic gains in north-western Bosnia by taking Vakuf, Jaice, Sanski Most, 
and Priedjor and was pressing toward Banja Luka, the British and American governments 
pressured Croatia to halt the campaign.IOO The U.S.-British initiative did not conform to 
any military logic. It merely deprived the interested external powers and Bosnia itself of a 
clear military solution to the war - the defeat of the Serb forces - that had never been 
closer before. But a clear military solution on the ground "was not envisaged by the 
American-led diplomatic initiative, which turned instead to a reworking of the previous 
'Contact Group' plan."IOI 
Consequently, by mid-September 1995, Washington officials were both privately 
and publicly pressing for the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims to stop their offensive in 
northwest Bosnia. Ambassador Galbraith delivered a formal message to the Croat defense 
minister urging the Croats to stop that offensive.I02 According to Mark Danner's account, 
Galbraith visited President Tudjman and handed him Washington's official message 
shortly before the Croats would surge into Krajina. "We are concerned, the diplomatic 
note said in part, that you are preparing for an offensive in sector south and north."i03 As 
Noel Malcolm observed, 
Stranger still was the fact that it was the Americans who had halted that 
military process and imposed quasi-partition instead, having spent the 
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previous three years criticizing European governments for their pursuit of 
diplomatic solutions derived from very similar principles. In the end, it 
seemed that American policy had succumbed to the false analysis which 
had so poisoned European policy ~ince the start of the war - an analysis 
which saw 'ancient ethnic hatreds' as the origin of the conflict, and 
therefore favored some kind of ethnic separation as a solution. 1 04 
3. Layered Analysis 
The Croat-Bosnian offensive proved to be a revealing indicator of perceptions at 
the top echelons of the American government. It revealed that "Most officials saw these 
military thrusts as simply another chapter in the dreary story of fighting and bloodshed in 
the region. They felt that the duty of our diplomacy was to put a stop to the fighting, 
regardless of what was happening on the ground." 
Robert D. Kaplan's book Balkan Ghosts had reportedly "profoundly shaped the 
President's thinking on the limitations of intervention in a part of the world where ethnic 
feuds have deep roots." I 05 The message that President Clinton "took from the book was 
that these people had been killing each other for 10 centuries,"I06 and naturally it looked 
as if there was little chance that one could ever do anything to stop such cycles of killing. 
Indeed, Clinton took action on Bosnia only under serious constraints and against the 
inclinations of some of his closest advisors on security matters. 
U.S. military and intelligence officials reportedly also opposed the continuation of 
Operation Storm from the very beginning. With the blessing of the State Department the 
American military had instructed Croat officers at the Petar Zrinski Military Academy in 
a "Democracy Transition Program" since 1994. Consequently many observers noted that 
Tudjman's Operation Storm seemed to "bear striking resemblance to current American 
doctrine, in particular the set of tactics known as AirLand Battle 2000."107 But by 
September 1995, the U.S. military and the CIA opposed any continuation of the Croat 
offensive. The Americans reportedly feared and predicted that the pursuit of the Croat 
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offensive would draw in the regular Serb army of Slobodan Milosevic and thus greatly 
widen the war. 
According to Mark Danner, only a few other officials, such as Richard Holbrooke 
and Ambassador Robert Frasure, had a different view. Their view was based on a 
Realpolitik approach. They believed that "the success of the Croatian offensive was a 
classic illustration of the fact that the shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually 
reflect the balance of forces on the ground."108 If this was the preferred approach and the 
desired outcome was a 51/49 division of the territory between the Federation and the 
Bosnian Serbs, then the course of action would follow logically. Since the Bosnian Serbs 
held 70 per cent of the territory before the Croat invasion in Krajina, "then some means 
had to be found to reduce their holdings"109 to the 51149 per cent ratio of the then-current 
"Contact Group" formula before the negotiations could have any chance to work. 
In other words, the Croat offensive was useful as long as the gains it added to the 
Federation did not exceed the 51 per cent limit. Consequently, even Holbrooke failed to 
grasp the golden opportunity available in September-October 1995. When the Croat-
Muslim offensive gave the Federation control over roughly 51 per cent of the Bosnian 
territory, Holbrooke, "as talented a diplomat as the U.S. has, pushed for what his 
president had demanded, and what his instincts required: the 'quick diplomatic 
solution."' 1 IO 
Furthermore, negotiations of some sort between Ambassador Frasure and 
Milosevic apparently took place in May 1995. As Jan Honig and Norbert Both put it in 
their book, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, no matter how short-lived the deal then 
concluded was, the U.S. decision to negotiate intensively with Milosevic, "the traditional 
villain of the Balkan piece, indicated that in the Clinton administration the wish to end 
the war was gaining the upper hand over the wish to punish the Serb aggressors." Ill 
The consensus at the top in U.S. decision-making circles was now complete. 
Since they all feared that such actions would only bring a wider war, the U.S. President 
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and his security advisors, the Congress, the diplomats, the intelligence community, and 
the military were all half-hearted when confronted with these questions: whether to 
encourage the Croats to retake Krajina and the Croats and the Muslims to retake the Serb 
conquests in Bosnia, and whether to use NATO airpower to attack the Serbs. 
The American fears pointed again and again toward Vietnam. Because of the 
October 1993 debacle in Somalia, some observers referred to a "Vietmalia effect." 
According to Richard Bolbrooke, U.S. officials, especially those in the military and 
intelligence agencies, refused to acknowledge that 
Bosnia was different, and so were our objectives. While we had to learn 
from Vietnam, we could not be imprisoned by it. Bosnia was not Vietnam, 
the Bosnian Serbs were not the Vietcong, and Belgrade was not Hanoi. 
The Bosnian Serbs, poorly trained bullies and criminals, would not stand 
up to ... air strikes the way the seasoned and indoctrinated Vietcong and 
North Vietnamese had. And, as we had seen in the Krajina, Belgrade was 
not going to back the Bosnian Serbs up the way Hanoi had backed the 
Vietcong.II2 
The West simply wasted a golden opportunity to achieve an enduring and just 
peace in Bosnia. At Dayton the interested external powers did not achieve a just peace, 
but simply the best peace the West was ready to offer. In his address to the Bosnians after 
the conclusion of the Dayton Accord, President Izetbegovic conceded that this was the 
case. "This may not be a just peace, but it is more just than a continuation of war ... In the 
world as it is, a better peace could not have been achieved."ll3 As Warren Bass has 
observed, "Dayton represented not the vindication of the liberal ideals with which Bill 
Clinton excoriated George Bush on the 1992 campaign trail - firm action to halt 
genocide, bringing war criminals to justice, tolerance, multiethnic nation-states, liberal 
nationalism, and the use of international and European institutions - but rather a version 
of the chilly realpolitik that kept the Bush administration out ofBosnia."ll4 
III Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both quoted in Mark Danner, "Bosnia: The Great Betrayal," The New 
York Review of Books, March 26, 1998, p. 43. 
1!2 Richard Holbrooke quoted in Mark Danner, '"Operation Storm,"' The New York Review of Books, 
October 22, 1998, p. 75. 
113 David Rieff, "Almost Justice," The New Republic, July 6, 1998, p. 37. 
114 Warren Bass, op cit., p. 96. 
83 
D. THE MATRIX 
The fourth step of the five-step analysis consists of a simplified graphical 
representation of the Bosnian case. The matrix in Figure 2 has been constructed so that 
each of the three functions of the major decision makers correlates with one of the three 
main types of failures the thesis has analyzed. The three echelons selected are broad and 
therefore involve a high level of generalization, but their selection is consistent with 
Huntington's three layers ofthe fault line conflict analysis scheme. 
The tertiary level includes not only the national security decision-making 
organizations but also the relevant international organizations. In the Bosnian case this 
level includes countries such as the United States, France, Britain, Germany, and Russia 
and relevant international and European organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the 
EC. It also includes individuals with significant influence on decision-making such as 
presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and intelligence community and military officials, 
as well as high-level UN, EC, and NATO officials. 
The secondary level includes the two "kin" countries involved in the Bosnian war, 
Croatia and Serbia, as well as the two leaders of these countries, Presidents Tudjman and 
Milosevic. 
The primary level consists of the three wamng parties in the Bosnian war, the 
Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims. It also includes the UN 
troops on Bosnian territory and the NATO forces that undertook missions in support of 
the UN. 
With so many actors the matrix could easily get overpopulated. To avoid that, 
Figure 2 simply identifies the tertiary, secondary, and primary levels without specifically 
mentioning who is responsible for specific failures. The matrix includes only the most 
fundamental and important decisions and indicates only the most obvious links in. the 
pathways to misfortune. 
E. PATHWAYS TO MISFORTUNE 
Tracking pathways to misfortune might oversimplify some relationships among 
failures, but this approach constitutes a useful device for analyzing military misfortunes. 
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Figure 2. Pathways to Misfortune Matrix 
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This exercise requires us to interpret the arrows' in the analytical matrix represented in 
Figure 2, which indicates relationships among various failures. 
The critical pathway to misfortune comes in the column headed "Elaborate and/or 
Implement Foreign Policy." It is owing to failures at all levels that the Serbs were not 
effectively opposed by military force. The boxes from l.B.l. through l.B.2, l.B.3., 
l.B.4., 2.B., 3.B.l, and 3.B.2 to box 3.B.3. combine into the long chain of Western 
failures to learn. Then we note a secondary pathway from the tertiary level boxes l.A.l. 
and l.A.2. that eventually also leads to the primary level box 3.B.3. The misleading 
message the United States, the UN, and the Europeans sent to the warring parties in 
Bosnia resulted in a lack of coordination among parties on the same side and complicated 
the work ofthe military planners preparing for future Western actions in Bosnia. 
The matrix demonstrates that we must hold the tertiary level responsible for the 
catastrophic failure in Bosnia. The top national and international security decision-
making levels are fundamentally responsible for failure under all three· columns. But 
obviously failure under the middle column makes the most significant contribution to the 
catastrophe. It shows that the main problems stemmed from the West's failure to 
coordinate national and international forces and to elaborate and implement a sound 
policy in Bosnia. 
Several critical failures interacted and generated lower level failures. The lack of 
coordination among the Western countries, the UN and NATO, and among the Western 
countries within the UN and NATO, long made the elaboration and implementation of a 
common Western policy impossible, and resulted in the West's erroneous policy of equal 
treatment to all the warring parties, the arms embargo, and acceptance of a de facto 
partition for a post-conflict arrangement in Bosnia. In their tum, these failures combined 
to generate one failure at the secondary level as well as three key failures at the primary 
level. 
The secondary level failure demonstrates how the lack of a common policy at the 
tertiary level leads to the absence of such a policy at the secondary level. This failure 
discouraged the Bosnian Croats and Muslims from coordinating their efforts against the 
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common enemy, the Serbs. Until the foundation of their Federation in March 1994 they 
had even fiercely fought each other. 
The primary level displays three key failures generated by critical failures at the 
tertiary level. The failure of the interested external powers to find a common policy and 
military strategy in Bosnia generated two failures at the level of the UN troops on the 
ground. First, the UN commanders on the scene applied their mandate narrowly because 
of the mistaken judgement that they had not been authorized to engage in peace 
enforcement. Political ambiguity made the military fear crossing the "Mogadishu line" 
that supposedly separates peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Second, the 
mandate of the UN troops and their missions were in total disagreement. Although they 
were assigned missions such as protecting the "safe areas," their mandate ignored the 
military requirements of such missions in the particular Yugoslav environment. Along 
with the failures in the tertiary level boxes l.B.l. and l.B.3., two other critical failures of 
the tertiary level- the ill-conceived Western arms embargo, and the equivalence policy 
- deprived the Bosnian Croats and Muslims of the means necessary for their legitimate 
self-defense while indirectly creating a significant advantage for the Serbs, who were 
much less affected by the arms embargo. These failures diverted the West's attention 
from the real villain in the Bosnian war, the Serbs. 
The secondary pathway to misfortune in the matrix also demonstrates that the 
tertiary level must be held responsible for generating failures at lower levels or for at least 
initiating them. It stems from the tertiary level boxes l.A. ~. and l.A.2., goes through 
boxes 2.A. and 3.A., transcends columns, goes through box 2.B., and eventually leads to 
box 3.B.3. ofthe primary level in the middle column under "Elaborate and/or Implement 
Foreign Policy." The West's critical failure to back up militarily its diplomatic 
recognition of Slovene, Croat and Bosnian independence affected the capability of the 
secessionist countries to face Serb military counter-measures. The other critical failure 
under the heading "Prevent Undesirable but Predictable Events in a Changing 
Environment," the West's ambiguous and contradictory policy, generated or at least 
favored the escalation of the rampant nationalism in all three Bosnian communities. 
Failure to stop the escalation of nationalism at this level affected the secondary level 
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where, under such circumstances, there was little scope even for coordination between 
parties confronting the same main enemy. As the matrix indicates, this failure eventually 
led to the failure in box 3.B.3. 
Given the disastrous performance of the UN, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Muslim 
troops, it is little wonder that "all roads lead to Rome" by eventually drawing us down to 
the critical failure in box 3.B.3. This box represents the primary level actors' lack of 
effectiveness when dealing with the Serbs. Furthermore, Figure 2 allows us to see that 
failure is not homogeneous and that pathways of misfortune cross boundaries to affect 
separate decision making functions and levels of command. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The most recent episode of the Bosnian saga is the story of a defeat of justice. 
Noel Malcolm has called it " a triumph of diplomacy over foreign policy."! All parties 
emerged from the Bosnian crisis with the feeling that their interests were respected, at 
least in the form of the lesser evil. But the main Western powers failed to devise an 
enduring peace for Bosnia. Ironically, "this disaster the diplomats called a victory."2 
However, this analysis of the Bosnian war allows us to draw several conclusions. 
First, as Noel Malcolm has pointed out, "looking back at the history of this war, 
one sees that the real causes of Bosnia's destruction have come from outside Bosnia 
itself, and have done so twice over: first in the form of the political strategy of the Serbian 
leadership, and then in the form of the miscomprehension and fatal interference of the 
leaders of the West. "3 The Western powers failed to understand the specificity of the 
distinctive Bosnian entity. This flawed understanding subordinated centuries of unity to 
the relatively recent split of the Bosnians into three communities in the nineteenth 
century. The Bosnians had lived together for centuries with no more violence among 
them than among peoples in other European countries, even though they had gradually 
adhered to different sets of values: Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic. It was only in the late 
nineteenth century that the conflicting interests ·of external powers from these three 
traditions that were seeking dominance in Bosnia encouraged Bosnians to falsely identify 
themselves with three ethnic groups. The West's acceptance of a de facto partition of 
Bosnia at Dayton constitutes a significant failure. 
After a fifty-year interruption, one that perpetuated a false approach to national 
identity, a period in which Communists had unsuccessfully tried to solve the problem of 
the nationalities in Yugoslavia by replacing ethnicity with class allegiance, the diverging 
interests of countries from three different traditions clashed once again in Bosnia. 
Nationalism naturally escalated at the end of oppressive Communism. 
I Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," The National Interest, No. 39 (Spring 1995), 
p. 3. 
2 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 21. 
3 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 251. 
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The West Europeans were split between, on the one hand, the French and the 
British, who "impartially" presided over the violent partition of Bosnia by the Serbs and 
Croats, and on the other hand, the Germans, the Austrians, and the Italians, who 
supported anything that could favor Croatia and the Bosnian Croat community in the 
partition process. The Russians supported the Serbs in their attempt to carve as much as 
possible from Bosnia when the Serbs realized they could no longer prevent its secession 
with political means. For their part, the Islamic partners of the United States- and other 
Islamic states- were supporting the interests of- or at least were watching closely, the 
developments regarding -the Muslim community in Bosnia. 
The West initially responded with an ambiguous policy that supported two goals 
that were contradictory in the circumstances in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. The West 
supported both democratization and the preservation of the unity of Yugoslavia. But the 
two goals were incompatible since the former encouraged disintegration, while the latter 
was anti democratic. 
After it had failed to prevent the war, the West also failed to take appropriate 
action to end it. The Western powers responded with a lack of coordination that fathered 
a sinuous policy that treated all warring parties equally. This flawed policy resulted in an 
ill-conceived arms embargo that favored the stronger Serbs and promoted an eventual 
acceptance of a de facto partition of Bosnia. 
Several examples demonstrate that the Western failure in Bosnia was an 
organizational failure. First, the self-induced paralysis throu~h the UN and NATO offered 
the Europeans, the Americans, and the other interested external powers a perfect inter-
blocking capability. Indeed, the crisis found a solution only when one party prevailed 
over the others. That is, the Americans prevailed over the Europeans; and NATO, 
supporting the American vision, prevailed over the UN. 
Second, the United States intervened despite its original unwillingness to do so. 
NATO had formally approved Op-Plan 40-104 that implied U.S. involvement in the 
crisis. In other words, only the NATO mechanism and the stake of the existence of the 
Alliance itself obliged the United States to intervene along with the other members and 
according to the rules of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
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Third, individuals played limited roles in the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. 
Despite his declarations during the 1992 presidential campaign, President Clinton 
followed the same Realpolitik that had kept President Bush away from involving U.S. 
troops in Bosnia. Yet he eventually committed U.S. military forces in spite of this 
reluctance. But this was only when, as a result of the Dole bill, the Congress threatened to 
take foreign policy leadership away from the White House. 
Fourth, the example of Generals Rose and Smith should be considered. While 
General Rose was reluctant to take any vigorous action against the Bosnian Serbs, 
General Smith tried to bring about a dramatic change in the UN' s approach toward the 
Serbs. But the UN initially rejected his strategy. Yet, when the functioning of the UN-
NATO relationship changed, the UN troops could withdraw form the areas that had made 
them vulnerable to the Serbian "hostage-taking" policy and NATO airplanes could strike 
vigorously. In other words, General Smith's strategy was then being applied. 
Flawed policies and poor coordination between political and military leaders 
generate bad military strategies. The initial UN military intervention in Bosnia reflected 
the "equivalence" policy the West had adopted toward the warring parties by engaging 
the UN troops only in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. Since the politicians did 
not want to take any serious action against the Bosnian Serbs, the military could not take 
any specific military action. The politicians even ignored fundamental military 
requirements. They tasked the UN troops with a mission they had neither the means nor 
the mandate to undertake: to defend the "safe areas" against military aggression. When 
the policy changed, the military strategy changed: NATO airplanes struck Serb targets. 
The military carried out the change in policy in September-October 1995. They 
performed successful operations until the politicians stopped them, even though a clear 
military victory against the Serbs was at hand. 
Until a late stage in the conflict, the Western powers failed to include the Croats 
and the Bosnian Croats and Muslims in their military plans regarding the conflict's 
resolution. The Bosnian govemmen~ never in fact asked for Western soldiers to risk their 
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lives on Bosnian soii.4 It had only asked for the right to self-defense long denied by the 
Western arms embargo policy. Properly armed, and given limited assistance from the air, 
the Bosnians could have regained the territory themselves. Moreover, when they 
eventually mounted the September-October 1995 offensive in cooperation with the 
Croats, the Western politicians flatly told them to stop it. The truth was that military 
means matter, but none of the West's diplomats wanted to admit that only the use of force 
could stop the war. 
Finally, the duration of the peace the Dayton Accord has brought is questionable 
for several reasons. First, it is a peace imposed from above that has been accepted by all 
parties only under Western, notably American, pressure. The Bosnian Serb 
representatives did not sign it, but President Milosevic did, with little concern for their 
preferences. Second, it does not represent justice and stability but rather a balance of 
power among external actors rather than among the local belligerents. Finally, it heavily 
relies upon the continued presence of Western troops on Bosnian soil. Moreover, while 
the military measures are being accomplished, the civilian measures an enduring peace 
demands are far from being implemented. Therefore, only the long-term presence of 
Western troops may provide a chance for recovery to a nation with little sense of national 
identity. But will the Western powers, notably the United States, be willing to pay this 
price? 
4 Noel Malcolm. "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," in The National Interest, No. 39 (Spring 
1995), p. 14. 
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